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It's a (Two-)Culture Thing: The Lateral 




rom an acute and, some will argue, a harsh, 
a harsh, fantastic or even tactically naive 
naive perspective, this article examines 
examines animal liberation, vegetarianism 
vegetarianism and veganism in relation to a 
bloodless culture ideal. It suggests that the 
movement's repeated anomalies, denial of heritage, 
privileging of vegetarianism, and other concessions 
to bloody culture, restrict rather than liberate the 
full subversionary and revelatory potential of 
liberationist discourse, and with representation and 
strategy implications. 
 
‘Only the profoundest cultural needs … initially caused adult man [sic] to 
continue to drink cow milk through life’.1 
 
In The Social Construction of Nature, Klaus Eder develops a useful concept 
of two cultures - the bloody and the bloodless. He understands the 
ambivalence of modernity and the relationship to nature as resulting 
from the perpetuation of a precarious equilibrium between the 
‘bloodless’ tradition from within Judaism and the ‘bloody’ tradition of 
ancient Greece.  
 
In Genesis, killing entered the world after the fall from grace and 
initiated a complex and hierarchically-patterned system of food taboos 
regulating distance between nature and culture. But, for Eder, it is in 
Israel that the reverse process also begins, in the taboo on killing. This 
‘civilizing’ process replaces the prevalent ancient world practice of 
                                                 
1 Calvin. W. Schwabe, ‘Animals in the Ancient World’ in Aubrey Manning  and James 
Serpell, (eds), Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives (Routledge, London, 
1994), p.54. 
F 
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human sacrifice by animal sacrifice, this by sacrifices of the field, and 
these by money paid to the sacrificial priests.2  
 
Modern society retains only a very broken connection to the Jewish 
tradition of the bloodless sacrifice. It continues instead a different 
traditional evolutionary line which emerges from the Greek polis. This 
ritual ‘civilized’ the earlier blood sacrifices in a different way to the 
Jewish tradition. It did not abolish them but retained them instead as a 
sacrificial feast in Delphi against the resistance of Pythagorean and other 
groups who attempted to call this central symbol of the polis into 
question.3 The dominant modern cultural code continues this older 
tradition, the bloody culture of Hellenistic antiquity, and symbolizes the 
fundamental distance from the state of nature.4 It is the co-existence of 
these, developing into carnivorous and vegetarian cultures, that opens 
two fundamentally different evolutionary options to modern society. 5 
 
We shall borrow the two culture concept and use it as a structuring 
device for our own purposes and, although we shall not be clinging to 
Eder's thesis, we shall draw upon it.6 Here we shall be assuming that 
animal liberation both constitutes and aims at the transformation of 
bloody into bloodless culture, at least in the most propitious conditions 
of the Western world initially. As representative of animal liberation we 
shall take first the most often quoted works of three of the movement's 
foremost philosophers - Peter Singer, Stephen Clark and Tom Regan - 
but we shall not offer critiques of their use of the philosophical traditions 
out of which they come, or indeed of the traditions themselves.7 Instead, 
and in a rather severe textual reading, we shall question animal 
liberation in relation to the two cultures. To start, we shall measure the 
canonical works against the slavery analogy, drawn by animal 
                                                 
2 Klaus Eder, The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological Enlightenment 
(Sage, London, 1996), p.125. 
3 Ibid., p.126. 
4 Ibid., pp.129-130. 
5 Ibid., p.132. 
6 Indeed, we cannot continue with Eder's bloody-carnivorous and bloodless-vegetarian 
cultures throughout, for Eder depicts ecological reason as vegetarian culture when the 
ecology movement is not necessarily vegetarian at all (in practice) whilst animal 
liberation has become so (in theory and in practice). Eder also tends to run animals and 
nature together, and views animal liberation almost wholly in utilitarianist terms. 
Further, although Eder pictures carnivorous culture as a development of bloody 
culture, and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless, we shall use carnivorous and 
bloody interchangeably and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless.  
7 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals , 1975 
(Avon, New York, 1977); Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals , 1977 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983 
(Routledge, London, 1988).  
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advocates for centuries, which will allow us to explore statements of 
animal liberation intent and therefore gain clues as to its ‘culture’ status, 
which will then be examined against a different model. We shall finally 
be able to suggest certain implications of the findings. 
 
The Slavery Analogy 
 
In an attempt to make animal liberation more credible and to awaken 
public consciousness to the scale, nature and values of animal use, the 
animal liberation movement uses several parallels, and abolitionism 
seems to be the most pertinent. Black peoples and other Others under 
slavery, like nonhumans now and in the past, were used as renewable 
(and expendable rather than exterminable) natural resources in a 
respectable economic system. The systematic atrocities of human 
slavery bear striking resemblance to the concept and practices of 
institutionalized animal use and continuities are identifiable.8 Moreover, 
both animal use and human slavery have been considered at various 
times synonymous with the process of civilizing and the progress of 
civilization. 
 
Let us assume the case then, acknowledging that there will always be 
exceptional, extraordinary and non-representative situations to which 
no philosophy can hope to extend with consistency (and this is not to 
assume, as the philosophies themselves do not assume, an absolute 
inviolability of all animal life). Let us assume that an animal liberation 
case could be made out, declaring that, à la the abolitionist case, humans 
should not deliberately use nonhumans for any non-symbolic purpose 
(except perhaps in non-invasive ethological studies in the wild) or in 
any material way in order to utilize their symbolic power. The aim of 
the abolitionists was abolition, not kinder treatment, better conditions, 
longer chains, fewer slaves, gentle usage or a different kind of slavery. 
Slavery was wrong, according to the campaigners, and the world (or 
most of it) came to agree or to see the wrong and put an end to it. How 
do the philosophers’ prescriptions stand in relation to this abolitionism? 
Not full square. 
 
Clark's promotion of anti-vivisection, for instance, is qualified by talk of 
abolishing ‘most’ biomedical research on animals,9 without saying what 
                                                 
8 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989) pp.1-2; Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and 
Animal Slavery (Heretic Books, London, 1988). 
9 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.xiii. 
Animal Issues, Vol 4, No. 1, 2000 
   
 
4 
should be left to continue and on what basis, and although Regan 
appears to be quite straightforward in his demands - for vegetarianism, 
anti-vivisection and an end to hunting and trapping - his idea that it is 
‘commercial’ animal agriculture which should be abolished leaves one 
considering what ‘non-commercial’ animal agriculture is envisaged as 
acceptable within his rights theory.10 As he implies, no animal-product 
system is viable in the long term without routine mutilation and 
slaughter, a similar point made in relation to suffering by Singer who 
calls for an end to the use of animals in trivial experiments whilst the 
suffering in non-trivial research can continue until alternative methods 
are found.11 
 
None of the three cases actually makes out a clear, unambiguous case 
for an end to all animal-using practices and, of an activity such as horse 
riding for instance, a classic master/slave relationship, there is no 
mention. Understandably, Singer, Clark and Regan concentrated on the 
areas in which vast numbers of animals are used and/or where 
institutionalized cruelties are more readily detectable, and did not set 
out to establish in detail the ‘proper’, or ‘better’ constructed behaviour 
in regard to all human/nonhuman practices and relations. Instead they 
establish principles from which we may be able to assume it in most if 
not all areas. But although we may extrapolate in order to get a grip on 
how we should look upon, say, animal circuses - obviously 
unacceptable to Singer, Clark and Regan albeit on different grounds - 
what guidance is there for something as innocuous to the orthodox as 
horse riding?12 
 
It is in this relationship that we can recognize: a human pastime 
presented and widely perceived as respectable; the combination of 
animals and war-victory - the hunting field as a preparation for battle 
and the use of animals for human warring purposes; animals considered 
as resources; the exercise of power and the domination of ‘nature’; the 
animal use=civilization equation; and the hidden stories of slavery 
which in different ways lie behind the use of animals - horses ‘broken’, 
family groups separated, animals not up to it or beyond it cast off. 
Moreover, once broken and separated it is still looked upon as a 
kindness to find them ‘work’, to keep them active, a practical example of 
                                                 
10 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, (Routledge, London, 1988), pp.349-351. 
11 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.32. 
12 This is not to enter into the crass area of objection-query - eg what about locusts, 
mosquitoes and rabid dogs, and should amoebae get the vote? - in which animal 
liberation is commonly bogged down.  
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culture passing itself off as benign nature (welfarism notably obscuring 
their confinement in barren fields deprived of cover and denied shelter). 
 
Now horse riding is possibly too complex for preference utilitarianism 
to condemn easily and it is not at all clear from Clark's work how it 
stands in relation to the ancient virtues of his neo-Platonist earth 
household. From Regan’s Case we can get the idea that horse riding may 
be anathema to at least rights theory, which can accommodate the 
objection, although it is only an informed guess: Regan's ‘not all harms 
hurt’ and his dissident reality of ‘animals are not our resources’ are 
shown to us in the contexts of more obvious harmful or hurtful use.13  
 
As we have seen them so far then, these philosophies do not actually 
spell out what some of them may imply and what they imply could be 
spelled out, and especially in a case such as horse riding. Indeed, 
precisely because of its ‘innocuity’, a condemnation of horse riding - or 
‘riding’ as its practitioners prefer it to be known: again the invisible 
animal - may be a classic statement of animal liberation from which a 
position on virtually every topic within the project could be then 
confidently assumed. Perhaps this could help liberate animal liberation 
from the confusion or seemingly endless and generally welfarist- (and 
therefore bloody culture-) framed, cruelty-abuse-suffering-grounded 
debate to which the liberation issue is popularly and politically 
relocated and by the terms of which even vivisection and factory 
farming can be and are easily defended.14   
  
Taking the foremost philosophers’ seminal works, we find discrepancies 
between the human and animal slavery abolitionisms. We have to look 
elsewhere for the kind of consistency15 we may require and get closer to 
a best existing model of and for animal liberation as an abolitionist, 
bloodless culture. 
 
                                                 
13 Bryant condemns horse riding but from an anti-cruelty perspective, albeit within an 
animal ‘rights’ framework. John Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms: An Examination of a 
Changing Ethic (J. M. Bryant, Chard, 1982). 
14 The liberationist fear may be of abolitionism being too easily equated with 
absolutism, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘extremism’ (as it is by Jasper and Nelkin) or even 
‘purism’, a fate from which other abolitionisms and emancipations are saved by the 
ability of new rights-holders to negotiate their own ‘working’ roles in society. On that 
score, animal liberation is a threat to the work ethic. J. M. Jasper, and D. Nelkin, The 
Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (The Free Press, New York, 1992), 
p.96, p.178. 
15 This is not to question the internal consistency or  coherence of the adopted or 
adapted philosophies.  
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Veganism: A Neglected Model 
 
Shortly after the Vegan Society was formed in 1944, and the word 
‘vegan’ coined by co-founder and first Secretary Donald Watson, it 
issued a Manifesto which included the following aims: 
 
To advocate that man's food should be derived 
from fruit, nuts, vegetables, grains and other 
wholesome non-animal products and that it should 
exclude flesh, fish, fowl, eggs, honey, and animals' 
milk, butter and cheese. 
 
The Vegan Society is eager that it should be realised 
how closely the meat and dairy produce industries 
are related. The atrocities of dairy farming are, in 
some ways, greater than those of the meat industry 
but they are more obscured by ignorance.16 
 
Further, it was proclaimed in 1951, that: 
 
The object of the Vegan Movement (“to end the 
exploitation of animals by man”) is clarified as to 
the meaning of exploitation by Rule 4(a), which 
pledges the Society to “seek to end the use of 
animals by man for food, commodities, work, 
hunting, vivisection, and by all other uses involving 
exploitation of animal life by man”. By the adoption 
of this rule, the Society has clearly come out on the 
side of the liberators; it is not so much welfare that 
we seek, as freedom. Our aim is not to make the 
present relationship between man and animal 
(which if honestly viewed is mostly one of master 
and slave) more tolerable, but to abolish it and 
replace it by something more worthy of man’s high 
estate. In short, our aim is to set the creatures free - 
to return them to the balance and sanity of nature, 
which is their rightful place, and so end the historic 
wrong perpetrated when man first decided he had 
the right to exploit and enslave them.17 
 
Now this throws up much we could discuss and which many would 
criticize - the perhaps primary concern about who ‘Man’ is; the take on a 
pure ‘nature’; the appeal to design; and so on (these being characteristic 
of the early Vegan Society stance) - but our point is that Leslie Cross 
                                                 
16 ‘The Vegan Society Manifesto’, The Vegan, (November 1944).  
17 Leslie J. Cross, ‘The New Constitution’, The Vegan, (Spring 1951). 
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went on to claim that this new constitution marked the ‘true birth’ of the 
Vegan Society and, if we are to measure animal liberation against the 
slavery analogy, this surely is the best available (albeit unparticularized) 
statement of intent. Can the master/slave relationship of horse riding be 
accommodated here (even if it was beyond the range of contemporary 
concern)? Only by preternormal sophistry.  
 
The Society, and vegans in general, had already established and were to 
consolidate a practical underpinning to animal liberation, living with 
moral consistency and proving the ethic's firm grounding. So, to what 
extent do Singer, Clark and Regan build on such codification? The great 
anomaly is, as we know, that Singer's Animal Liberation actually 
promotes the use of animals. That Singer should, some thirty years after 
the Society’s founding, approach the subject of animal liberation in the 
following way, is perhaps rather curious, notwithstanding the 
reasonable pragmatics - a chapter entitled ‘Becoming a Vegetarian’18 
rather than ‘Becoming a Vegan’; a toleration of mollusc-eating;19 
promotion of egg-eating, where a welfarist-bloody culture stance is 
openly adopted;20 the use of inverted commas for vegan; the phrase ‘… 
some have begun to call themselves vegans’;21 the adoption, like Salt, of a 
‘worst abuses first’ stance;22 the deliberation over where to draw the line 
between killing shrimps and oysters whilst considering the sufferings 
(and suffering is Singer's main concern) of the dairy cow and calf as a 
lesser issue;23 and, in a concession to popular rhetoric, the general 
depiction of veganism as ‘strict’ and somewhat esoteric. Do Clark and 
Regan also keep veganism at arm's length? Clark makes this claim: 
 
What follows for our obligations? Simply, that if we 
are to mean what we say in outlawing the 
unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become, 
at the least, vegetarians.24  
 
With veganism well established - and with the routine chickicide of day-
old males, the suffering of the dairy cow and the immediate or delayed 
slaughter or crated future of her calf exposed (again) by the Vegan 
Society - Clark did not feel the need to write instead, ‘we must become, 
                                                 
18 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.163. 
19 Ibid., p.179. 
20 Ibid., p.181; Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 1990, Second edition (Pimilco, London, 
1995), pp.175-176. 
21 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.179. 
22 Ibid., pp.181-182. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.45. 
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at the least, vegans’. Although he refers to veganism several times, as a 
stage of progression, thus implying as is usual, that veganism is a 
material development rather than a cognitive transformation (‘… those 
vegetarians who have not (yet) progressed to veganism’ he says, for 
instance, in his ‘Notes for Proselytes’ after the main body of the work),25 
it is vegetarianism for which he makes the case. However, he does grant 
veganism greater credibility and probability: ‘There will be less 
suffering in a vegan world, even in a near-vegan world’.26 But, although 
declaring in a footnote that ‘veganism is a better project than lacto-
vegetarianism’, he goes on to say: ‘we may in the end be able to take 
some milk from our kin without injustice’.27 But why this concession to 
the purely cultural (whilst the essentialism of ‘meat’-eating is 
outlawed)? And is this, along with other backyard images, what Regan 
had in mind when he condemned only ‘commercial’ animal agriculture? 
 
There is also Regan's preference for the word ‘vegetarian’ which is used 
throughout The Case for Animal Rights. Now it had for long been the 
American practice, somewhat in contrast to English usage since the 
1940s-50s, to use the word ‘vegetarian’ as all-embracing (and technically 
correct it is or, more accurately, was), despite the existence of an 
American Vegan Society since 1960. So it is reasonable to assume that 
Regan, in talking of the total dissolution of commercial animal farming, 
was perhaps thinking veganically, reservations about ‘commercial’ 
notwithstanding. This is supported, for instance, by Regan's later article 
with Gary Francione which claims that rights (now seen in vegan terms) 
and welfare ideologies are morally incompatible, a tacit understanding 
of bloody and bloodless cultures.28 Nevertheless, ‘vegan’ was not used 
ten years earlier in the major work which came partly as a response to 
Singer, who differentiated between vegetarians and vegans.  
 
Is Regan's whole effect warped by not using the word ‘vegan’? Not 
using it can lead not least to problems of both spatial and intellectual 
comprehension as any vegan, considered to be ‘a vegetarian’, has found 
in hotels, restaurants, on airlines or even as a guest in a private home. 
The implications are far-reaching, for by it, both here and in Singer and 
Clark, vegetarianism is typically equated with rights theory and indeed 
with animal rights and animal liberation. When we can regularly read 
about celebrities and others being described as ‘vegetarians’ only to find 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p.213. 
26 Ibid., p.80. 
27 Ibid., p.185. 
28 Tom Regan and Gary Francione, ‘A Movement's Means Create its Ends’, The Vegan, 
(Winter, 1993). First published in The Animals' Agenda, (January-February, 1992). 
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that they eat fish, the word and concept of veganism, by contrast, 
constitute a clear and unequivocal statement (or do so when not 
clouded by vegetarianism).  
 
Vegetarianism's milky dilutions would appear not only to weaken the 
vegan, animal-free, comprehensive principle but also fail to loosen 
sufficiently orthodoxy’s long established meanings of 
human/nonhuman relations and definitions of animal liberation. There 
can still be detected an accommodating vagueness (and tactical 
tortuousness) which only disappears with veganism’s clearing away of 
shams, fictions and concealments, its lack of concession to orthodox 
ontology and, see Adams 1994, its determining epistemology.29 There is 
a world (or world-view) of difference between vegetarianism and 
veganism. It's a culture thing, as we shall see. 
 
A Repeated Anomaly 
 
The chronology is awry then; momentum appears to have been lost. For 
whatever reasons or motives (and there is an obvious tension between 
ethics and tactics), veganism was not or appeared not to be the 
philosophers’ alpha (leaving aside pre-verbal mappings) and omega in 
the 1970s and '80s. This had happened before: it is a repeated anomaly. 
In 1892, Henry Salt had claimed in Animals' Rights that assertions of one 
form of animal exploitation being more or less cruel than any other, 
were ‘irrelevant’30 whilst at the same time advocating egg-eating, milk-
drinking and wool-wearing.31 What places Salt, like Singer, Clark and 
Regan it would seem, within the increasingly identifiable area of bloody 
and bloodless culture tension are comments which can be juxtaposed 
thus:  
 
It is little use to claim ‘rights’ for animals in a vague 
general way, if with the same breath we explicitly 
show our determination to subordinate those rights 
to anything and everything that can be construed 
into a human ‘want’.32 
 
                                                 
29 Carol J. Adams, ‘Beastly Theology: When Epistemology Creates Ontology’ in her 
Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (Continuum, New York, 
1994). 
30 Henry S. Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress, 1892 (Centaur 
Press, Fontwell, 1980), p.106. 
31 e.g. Ibid., p.43; Henry S. Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism: Essays and Dialogues (London 
Vegetarian Society, London, nd (1899)), pp.35-38. 
32 Salt, Animal Rights Considered, p.9. 
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And, perhaps out of a narrow focus on normative cruelty: 
 
What I say will of course have no reference to wool, 
or any other substance which is obtainable without 
injury to the animal from which it is taken.33  
 
For Salt, who considered the question of whether man is morally 
justified in utilizing animal labour at all as ‘abstruse’,34 animals were still 
resources. Further: 
 
I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary 
contention that man is not morally justified in 
imposing any sort of subjection on the lower 
animals.35  
 
He was referring to the contention of Lewis Gompertz who, some 
seventy years earlier, had written: 
 
at least in the present state of society it is unjust, 
and considering the unnecessary abuse they suffer 
from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use 
them, and to encourage their being placed in his 
power.36  
 
Lewis Gompertz, second Secretary of the SPCA, champion of the ‘rights’ 
of women, blacks, the poor and nonhumans, published his Moral 
Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes in 1824, a work whose 
strategic and tactical approaches are reversed by Singer: 
 
in our present speciesist world, it is not easy to keep 
so strictly to what is morally right [i.e. not using 
dairy products]. 37 
 
We see from Gompertz that it was not the case, as some have claimed, 
that Salt left little for his heirs to add, but that he and they left out a lot 
of Gompertz who, although his work is not fully formulated, being 
more of an uncertain inclination, outlined most of what was to follow, 
and more. Recognizing human-nonhuman similitude, animals' personal 
identity, and promoting equal pleasure and happiness in the cause of 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p.79 
34 Ibid., p.43. 
35 Ibid., p.33. 
36 Cited in Ibid. 
37 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.181. 
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what was moral and just, Gompertz was, like some others6,38 a vegan 
long before the word was coined, dispensing with wool, leather, silk 
and eggs and refusing to ride in a horse-drawn carriage. Much of Moral 
Inquiries is taken up in the form of subversionary ‘arguments’ (with 
Gompertz as Z): 
 
Y: I understand that you object to the use of milk; 
what harm can there be in that? 
Z: It was evidently provided for the calf, and not for 
man. 
Y: When the calf is taken away from its mother, it is 
then a kindness to relieve her of her milk. 
Z: But the calf should not be taken away.39  
 
For both Salt and the philosophers to fall short of overt endorsement of 
Gompertz and veganism also means not capitalizing on the substantive 
shift of his revelatory light which, aptly, he shines on horses. His 
concern with the way they were treated appears foremost in his work 
but extends beyond questions of cruelty. Asked, ‘How can man do 
without the aid of horses?’, Gompertz's reply is, ‘That is his business to 
find out’,40 perhaps a typical response from one famed also for a 
catalogue of technological inventions. He goes on: 
 
It is true that we have adopted the method of 
employing horses to perform our labour, by which 
we have most probably only chosen one method 
out of a great many, and we have remained 
contented with it … What causes you to think the 
services of horses so important to man is, that you 
take things as they are; horses being used….41 
 
What is important here is that very ability to see, not only the suffering 
of horses when most others could not see it (which was Salt's concern), 
but that animals, horses, were being used in the first place (which wasn't 
Salt's concern, until later).42 Gompertz exposes the mythology of animal 
                                                 
38 One of the earliest recorded vegans in Britain was Roger Crab who died at Bethnal 
Green in 1680 (see The Vegan, Summer, 1997, p.25) but, as early as 3BC, Porphyry and 
Claudius Neapolitan wrangled over dispensing with all animal products. 
39 Lewis Gompertz, Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and Brutes, 1824 (Centaur 
Press, Fontwell, 1992), p.97. 
40 Ibid., p.122. 
41 Ibid., pp.123-125. 
42 Salt came to see it more from Gompertz's  angle: ‘a civilized posterity will shudder at 
the sight of what we still regard as a legitimate agent of locomotion’. Henry S. Salt, 
Seventy Years Among Savages (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1921), p.217. 
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use naturalism and inevitability and, in the milk argument above, of 
bloody culture's tender mercies. 
 
Regardless of the philosophical position or other grounding, and of 
interim tactical considerations, espousing animal liberation without 
affirming and valorizing veganism - as both theoretical starting point 
and practical aim - when the model(s) already exist, takes animal 
liberation’s eyes off the prize. Whether Regan and Clark are promoting 
veganism or not, it is lacto-ovo-vegetarianism which, one hundred and 
seventy years after Gompertz, is popularly taken as the obligatory 
stance of animal liberationists. Indeed, the recoil, if that's what it is, 
seems endemic. As Leah Leneman has shown us, the vigorous 
correspondence during 1909-1912 in the Vegetarian Society's journal The 
Vegetarian Messenger and Health Review had led to the conclusion that the 
defence of the use of eggs and milk by vegetarians was unsatisfactory 
and that the only ‘true way’ was to ‘live on cereals, pulse, fruit, nuts and 
vegetables’.43 Nevertheless, in what was becoming a familiar pattern, 
this was reversed in the decades that followed.  
 
The immediate or ultimate disdain, marginalization or even total 
exclusion have also been contagious, and across the spectrum. Robert 
Garner's strategy-minded work, for instance, talks of the vegetarian and 
vegan societies in Britain and elsewhere all campaigning to end animal 
cruelty ‘which for them involves the end of the meat industry’ (no 
mention of dairy or eggs) and even manages to omit the Vegan Society 
from its listing of the other three organizations which formed the Great 
British MeatOut coalition in the late 1980s.44 The ‘manifesto’ edited by 
Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris had few references to veganism45 
which is at best a subtext in the review-and-recommend essays of the 
Garner-edited Animal Rights: The Changing Debate.46 Richard D Ryder's 
chronicle47 and (notably from ‘outside’ of animal liberation) Keith 
Tester's new historicist exaggerations48 merely acknowledge veganism, 
                                                 
43 Leah Leneman, ‘Britain's First Vegans?’, The Vegan, (Winter, 1997); Leah Leneman, 
‘No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909-1944’, Society and Animals, 
7/3, (1999), pp.219-228. 
44 Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1993), p.39, p.186. 
45 Ruth Harrison, ‘On Factory Farming’ in R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, and J. Harris 
(eds), Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans  
(Gollancz, London, 1971), p.23. 
46 Robert Garner (ed), Animal Rights: The Changing Debate (Routledge, London, 1996). 
47 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989). 
48 Keith Tester, Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (Routledge, London, 
1991). 
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give the briefest of descriptions and fail to record the foundation or 
existence of a Vegan Society, despite the latter offering a critique of 
Bryant for whom, almost uniquely, veganism is de rigueur within 
‘animal rights’.49 Ted Benton's eco-socialism, which identifies rights 
theory with an opposition to 'animal agriculture', nevertheless equates it 
with vegetarianism (thus following the Regan confusion) and not 
veganism which, again, is Cinderella'd in favour of a ‘high welfare’ 
model.50 And philosopher-activists Finsen & Finsen51 still refer to 
Gompertz as a vegetarian (Singer refers to him as a ‘strict’ vegetarian52) 
and, like Singer, use inverted commas for their reference to vegans. Eder 
too, in referring to animal liberation never mentions veganism and, 
although his ‘vegetarian culture’ is seen in terms of negating social 
order, lacto-ovo-vegetarianism maintains hierarchies in terms of the 
primacy of animal protein and sustains the negative magic of complex 
food taboos which normalize animal-dependent diets.53 Indeed, for 
virtually all the popular and academic literature on or referring to 
animal liberation, vegetarianism rather than veganism is the common 
coin.  
 
Moreover, that Donald Watson and Leslie Cross are ignored by Magel54 
and Wynne-Tyson,55 the two works which represent the movement's 
most comprehensive and specific archaeologies of pro-animal thought, 
would seem to weaken these attempts to help legitimate the tradition 
and authority of animal liberation heritage through its hallowed value-
leaders.56  
 
                                                 
49 Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms 
50 Ted Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (Verso, 
London, 1993). 
51 L. Finsen and S. Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to 
Respect (Twayne, New York, 1994), p.284, p.155. 
52 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.244; Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11. 
53 Eder, The Social Construction of Nature. 
54 Charles R. Magel, Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights (Mansell, London, 
1989). 
55 Jon Wynne-Tyson (ed), The Extended Circle: An Anthology of Humane Thought, 1985 
(Cardinal, London, 1990). 
56 Nonetheless, the value of Wynne-Tyson's work here resides not least in illustrating 
how animal concern has been edited out by mainstream collections, eg the Oxford 
Dictionary of Quotations. In further defence of Wynne-Tyson we should acknowledge 
his largely overlooked comment on veganism in Food for a Future: ‘The logic of the 
vegan case is absolute. No one - whether nutritionist, physician, sociologist or layman - 
can rebut the veganic argument in any important respect. Veganism is part of the most 
truly civilised concept of life of which the human mind has been capable’. Jon Wynne-
Tyson, Food for a Future: The Complete Case for Vegetarianism, 1975 (Centaur Press, 
Fontwell, 1979), p.107 
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However, there appears to have been a latterday shift towards the 
vegan nexus by some. In several of the campaigning magazines one 
notices at the turn of the millennium - as with Regan and Francione - a 
growing emphasis on veganism in, for instance, the promotion of vegan 
food items and the publication of vegan rather than vegetarian recipes. 
And some hitherto hidden agendas have now been willingly revealed. 
Yet it has all taken a very long time to catch the shirt tails of Watson and 
Cross, indeed with those of Gompertz.  
 
The delay has served to render animal liberation somewhat confusing 
and confused as to its aims (important for those outside the movement) 
and therefore its means (important to the cognoscente). Even now, the 
Vegetarian Society actively promotes animal products. And, possibly for 
tactical reasons, many of the (now mainly vegan-staffed) organizations 
do still tend to promote by name the more ‘user-friendly’ option of 
vegetarianism, and anti-vivisection organizations have promoted 
‘cruelty-free’ products containing animal ingredients (thus failing to 
redefine cruelty). Moreover, throughout the 1990s, there seems to have 
been an increasing association of vegetarianism with ‘animal rights’ 
through female vegetarian-welfarist celebrities, which may sustain the 
old derogatory representation of sentimental animal concern.  
 
Although there are other factors involved, such as which foods are 
‘male’ and which ‘female’ and which are essentialisms and which 
culturalisms, and all the tactical decisions which will flow from such 
considerations, this has much to do with the ‘worst abuses first’ stance.57 
What is 'worst' is not only arbitrarily decided but appears to depend on 
the extent of one's empirical knowledge of animal use (witness Singer's 
laudable volte-face on wool after reading Townend).58 The movement 
seems to have set in stone the construction that ‘meat’-eating is worse 
than other forms of animal consumption, establishing a hierarchical 
scale to be negotiated as one finds out more, even though knowledge of 
the stories behind all animal products is more readily available now 
than it was in 1892, or even in 1975 (despite the Vegan Society making 
available such information for years prior to then and Singer, like Salt, 
had read Gompertz before laying out his ethics).59 Indeed, submitting to 
                                                 
57 Salt's own ‘worst abuses first’ approach to ‘extreme vegetarianism’ displays a greater 
anticipation of veganism in his later The Logic of Vegetarianism. See George Hendrick 
and Willene Hendrick, The Savour of Salt: A Henry Salt Anthology (Centaur Press, 
Fontwell, 1989), p.27. The particular passage was omitted from the London Vegetarian 
Society's revised and abridged edition (Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism)  
58 Singer, Animal Liberation cf Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed.; Christine Townsend, 
Pulling the Wool (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1985). 
59 Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11. 
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this, the Vegan Society is today reduced to specifically targeting 
vegetarians rather than the general public(s), and the UK has still not 
seen concerted anti-animal milk, anti-egg or anti-wool campaigns. 
(Perhaps there is a linguistic problem: does the inability to name the 
non-milk-egg-wool-using meat-eater preclude the stance and therefore 
bar that road? But, conversely, if to be named is to be controlled, maybe 




Crucially perhaps, the abiding common association of vegetarianism with 
'animal rights' associates animal liberation with animal use, and animal 
use is welfarist, bloody culture, territory. We can pursue this. Carol J 
Adams offers us the notion of ‘the vegetarian quest’, the first step of 
which is  
 
experiencing the revelation of the nothingness of meat 
as an item of food…which arises because one sees 
that it comes from … someone, and it has been 
made into … no-body. The revelation involves 
recognizing the structure of the absent referent.60  
 
The second step is naming the relationships, eg the connection between 
meat on the table and a living animal; between a sense that animals 
have rights and that killing them for meat violates those rights; the 
recognition of the violence of meat eating; and possibly of the continuity 
between meat eating and war. This stage also enables the reclaiming of 
appropriate words for meat, from euphemisms, distortions and mis-
naming. The third step is rebuking the meat-eating world by proving that 
an alternative to meat-eating exists and that it works; ‘vegetarians… 
seek to change the meat eating world’.61 
 
It is the second and third steps in which we are interested here. 
Regarding the possibility of the second - remembering why the Society 
had been formed in 1944 while war was still raging, Donald Watson 
wrote the following (as Leneman62 1999 has reminded us): 
 
Why did we do it then of all times? Perhaps it 
seemed to us a fitting antidote to the sickening 
                                                 
60 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory 
(Polity Press, London, 1990), pp.175-179. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Leneman, ‘No Animal Food’. 
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experience of the War, and a reminder that we 
should be doing more about the other holocaust 
that goes on all the time. 63 
 
But Watson took further Adams' third step, of rebuking the meat-eating 
world. Although appreciating the efforts of vegetarians, he also rebuked 
the non-vegan vegetarian world: it was to be demonstrated that veganism 
works. If the Great War gave rise to a revelation of continuities between 
warring and animal-eating (as it had for Salt,64), it was the effect of the 
second war which, for some, took the process across to re-connect with 
Gompertz's vision. 
 
Watson's own connection of animals, veganism and peace not only 
identifies bloody culture rationalism’s nadir but also expands the war 
‘front’ (another of Adams’ notions65) to recognize not just all animals but 
all animal products and, for Leslie Cross and the Society as we saw 
earlier, all animal use. But Watson goes on, and in the process both 
disrupts the foster mother symbolism of old world creation myth - the 
Egyptian Pyramid Texts’ cultural-need depiction of the pharaoh 
suckling from the cow mother of humankind - and reverses the values 
of sacred and profane: 
 
though nature provides us with lots of examples of 
carnivores and vegetarians it provides us with no 
examples of lacto-carnivores or lacto-vegetarians. 
Such groups are freaks and only made possible by 
man's capacity to exploit the reproductive functions 
of other species. This, we thought, could not be 
right either dietetically or ethically. It was certainly 
wrong aesthetically, and we could conceive of no 
                                                 
63 Donald Watson, ‘Out of the Past’, The Vegan, (Summer, 1988). Watson had also 
grasped what Salt seems to have suspected already at the turn of the century: that the 
virtually automatic progress inherent in nineteenth century evolutionary concepts 
shifted into an unspecific ‘social change’ in the twentieth; that the idea of united, 
comprehensive progress was replaced by an understanding of uneven and partial 
change, different aspects of society falling out of step with each other (notably the 
animals issue being left aside); and that change then had to be forced – one  couldn't 
wait for inevitability or for the ripe time. See Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), p.184. In the light of this - and Watson had dealt with the 
‘delaying tactic’: ‘There is an obvious danger in leaving the fulfilment of our ideals to 
posterity, for posterity may not have our ideals’ - we could ask what ‘the plan’ is. To 
wait until an as yet unspecified percentage of the population is vegetarian before 
veganism dare become the name of the game? Donald Watson The Vegan News, 1, 
(November, 1994). 
64 Salt, Seventy Years Among Savages, pp.219-230. 
65 Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat, pp.120-141. 
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spectacle more bizarre than that of a grown man 
attached at his meal-time to the udder of a cow.66 
 
Now, if humans have gone from being pre-hunt, pre-ethical vegan to 
being animal eaters and then, only with the neolithic revolution, to full-
blown lacto-ovo-carnivorism then, in this sense, lacto-ovo-
vegetarianism is firmly rooted in animal-based agriculture: it is animal-
using culture’s freakish form of veganism just as the animals used have 
been turned into freakish Forms. 
 
We need to re-assess the two culture concept, as it appears that we now 
have two different versions. One, extending Eder’s thesis, would 
perhaps place veganism as the fuller development of bloodless culture. 
However, if we take our lead from the vegan exemplars, we can suggest 
that veganism is no such thing but, rather, that it is veganism which is 
bloodless culture,67 wherever it originates: most plausibly perhaps in an 
innate alternative potential of both individual and society. We cannot 
suggest that Watson and Cross are claiming any of this, but we can 
suggest that they are, in their turn, discovering and connecting with 
bloodless culture as that very option, one which has been consistently 
rejected and obscured since the time of cultivation and domestication, 
efforts being made ever since to reconnect with the primal sympathy. 
Eder’s bloodless culture starting point in Judaism can be seen as just one 
effort, and the vegan Eden of the troubled writers of Genesis, torn again 
between two cultures, may have been another.  
 
Our entire history can be seen in this light.68 Most of history's ‘bloodless 
culture’ representatives - including the famous anti-cruelty foxhunters 
and animal-eating anti-vivisectionists - have been in some half-way 
house, trying to reach out to a bloodless culture ideal but pulled back by 
the internalized values of bloody culture, the numbing and blinding 
                                                 
66 Watson, ‘Out of the Past’. 
67 Of course, for humans at least, there is probably no such thing as truly bloodless 
culture: it remains an ideal, probably an unattainable one. But, rather than using 
unavoidable bloodletting - eg in the tilling of soil or in defence - as the premiss from 
which to exploit, veganism is surely bloodless culture in its original and continuing 
intent, in its deliberate non-use. It is the bloodless culture of which we know humans to 
be capable. (Gompertz's own suggestion that we might eat animals which died of 
natural causes seems to have been inspired by the belief he was encouraged to hold: 
that his health would suffer without animal products, a familiar story in 1944 and even 
at the turn of the millennium: bloodless culture spells anaemia for the orthodox). 
68 And no less than in the equally valid light of ‘The history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of the struggle between humans and non-humans’. John Simons, 
‘The Longest Revolution: Cultural Studies after Speciesism’, Environmental Values, 6, 
(1997), p.484. 
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comforts of its cosmology(ies), and the entirely practical impossibilities 
which no longer obtain in the Western world.  
 
Vegetarianism itself, seemingly a product of bloody culture, is a cultural 
ersatz, and appropriation. It may be a ‘further step’ from today's 
vegetarianism to  veganism but on a lateral, cross-culture (cognitive) 
route, not on a vertical, intra-culture (material) one. Not so much a 
development or Ederian evolution as an abandonment of one culture for 
another.69 In a remarkable testimony proving that conscience is an 
indispensable factor in the best scientific equation Watson and Cross, 
like Gompertz and others, in much doubt due to orthodoxy's command 
of nutritional knowledge, put bloodless culture in sharper perspective, 
liberated from the eternalization of animal use, from the mythology of 
the animal-product dietary and from the power-based ambivalence of 
human/nonhuman relations, all of which are retained by vegetarianism.  
 
And this has many implications, not least of which are for the 
effectiveness of the movement's oppositional discourse and its 
strategic/tactical dilemmas - which ends are dictating which means, or 
vice versa, as the movement shifts, in part, from protest to public policy 
activity70 - and for normative perceptions and ideological 
representations of animal liberation, many of which picture it as an 
extreme of orthodoxy, eg an overidentification with animals, thus of 
course validating the centre of animal-use, using the ALF as a political 
synecdoche (strategy and representation having influenced the 
philosophies in the first place). The equating of animal liberation with 
vegetarianism affords the extreme label a certain legitimacy, for 
vegetarianism seems to reside at bloody culture's refined periphery, at 
its opposite pole to the raw bloody culture of, for example, hunting, 
Roman and Renaissance periods. (Thus circumscribed it remains, albeit 
idiosyncratically, within the realm of private lifestyle-menu options. 
And this relates too to Tester's ability to entrap ‘animal rights’ within 
the realm of bloody culture's anthropocentric ‘entrapment’ of animals). 
But it would be illegitimate to view and represent veganism-animal 
                                                 
69 If there is a sense of development or evolution of bloodless culture it would be, 
perhaps, to fruitarianism but how practicable that would be for whole societies has yet 
to be shown, as have hitherto vague notions of non-exploitative symbiotic human-
nonhuman relations. 
70 The outcome of an animal liberation which does not emulate and unequivocally 
advocate non-use and uphold veganism as its base line is, ironically, illustrated in a 
'state of the cause' comment by Singer himself: ‘What disturbs me is the fact that the 
thrust for a really radical change in our attitude to animals - in other words, for equal 
consideration of the interests of animals - keeps getting sidetracked into small 
increments of progress in animal welfare’. Peter Singer, Interview in Outrage, 
(June/July, 1993). 
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liberation as an extreme rather than as, together, a genuine alternative 
culture, civilization and civilizing process, one which is not defined and 
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Truths: The Challenge of Animal Liberation’. 
                                                 
71 None of the foregoing has meant to suggest of course that veganism is itself a 
strategy. 
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y wombat Birubi died after a brief illness sometime around 
Wednesday August 18th 1999. I miss Birubi greatly and 
continue to catch his beloved form (or ‘ghost’) out of the 
corner of my eye, a half-seen image flitting around the corner 
of a cupboard or across the verandah. Long after his death, my eyes 
continued to search out his shape on the moonlit grass. He was part of 
my life for so long – over twelve years – that I found it hard to believe 
he would no longer wait for me or greet me, that he was finally gone.  
 
We had a wake for him a few days later. The idea of the wake was to 
focus on his life rather than his death, to honor presence rather than 
mourn absence, and to celebrate and express gratititude for Birubi’s life 
and for wombat life more generally. We had a small ceremony for him, 
and told many Birubi stories and wombat stories generally. Many of the 
people who helped care for Birubi over the years when I was working 
overseas or in distant parts of Australia were present with their own 
experiences and thoughts to contribute. The wake was far from being a 
dismal occasion. Birubi had a full and whole wombat life and died what 
seemed to be a dignified and peaceful wombat death. He came to the 
house for sanctuary in his final months and often rested or slept in front 
of the fire, but returned to his burrow, snug pouch of mother earth, in 
his last hours.  
 
Birubi came to me from the wildlife rescue service as a malnourished 
and very sick orphan. His mother had probably died of the mange, a 
disease introduced by europeans with their dogs that brings so many 
wombats to an early and tormented death. Since my own human son 
had recently died, Birubi and I bonded strongly. Birubi (the name, 
meaning I believe ‘the drum’, was given him by his first carers in the 
rescue service) was about a year old, furred but still suckling, when he 
M 
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took up residence with me. He seemed to have suffered greatly from his 
mother’s death and was desperate for care. 
 
Birubi had received from his wombat mother a good quality wombat 
education; she had taught him to defecate outside the burrow (or its 
equivalent, my house), and the rudiments of survival in the bush. 
Within a day of arriving he learnt to open the sliding glass doors of the 
house and could go outside into the bush whenever he wished (which 
was often). His ability to control the access between his world and mine 
enabled him to be active in choosing and structuring the balance 
between us, to enter my world while still fully retaining his 
wombatness. He was generally wary of humans until he had clearly 
established their identity, and would exit the house if it was too noisy or 
unsettling. 
 
Birubi grew to belong to both the world of the house and that of the 
forest, supposedly exclusive and mutually oppositional. He needed a lot 
of medical treatment and supplementary feeding for the first year, so he 
became accustomed to the house and knew something of its comforts. 
But from the beginning he was based primarily out of doors in various 
holes he selected or renovated, and always preferred that world. Once 
established in his own nearby burrows in the forest, he came to the 
house on a visiting basis on the average for an hour or so most evenings 
for  personal, moral and material support. (At his behest I supplemented 
his grazing with carrots and rolled oats, which corresponded to the 
roots and seeds sections of the wombat diet). In the first year he would 
spend part of the night out of doors, and part in my bed with me. He 
initiated all these high contact arrangements, and would not easily be 
turned aside from them, (although since wombats are nocturnal, they 
often led to me getting inadequate sleep). Sometimes I had to exclude 
him by locking the doors if he became too demanding of my time or 
arrived at very unreasonable hours.  
 
To sleep next to me was his ardent desire, but it presented some 
difficulties. It was wise to get the leeches and ticks off him before letting 
him into the bed if you wanted a comfortable rest. After I had got into 
bed, he would come over and start biting its edge furiously until I gave 
him a hand up. Once in bed, he would usually lie down next to me on 
his side and drop off like a light. I can attest that during sleep he often 
ground his teeth and also vocalised in ways that suggested the 
imaginary encounters of dreaming. Usually he would wake up again 
about two hours later and go outside to graze (and of course I was then 
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obliged to get up to close the door he left open in case dangerous or 
unsuitable animals entered.) 
 
Since he was a skilful door and cupboard opener, Birubi had to be 
locked out of the house when there was nobody else there. There are 
many stories about what happened when Birubi got into the house 
without supervision. He was very skilful with his mouth, which he used 
for manipulation and encounter, and enjoyed opening and exploring 
food packages and biting hard furniture and soft stuffed things. His 
tastes are commemorated around my house on cushions, chairs, stools, 
hassocks and cupboard doors.  
 
Birubi was a vigorous player of various wombat chasing and hiding 
games he began to teach me as soon as he recovered his strength. These 
games seemed to me (there is of course much uncertainty here) to roll 
together features of play, love and war. He played very rough by 
human standards, but I do not think that he really intended to hurt - it’s 
probably just that wombats are tougher, especially around the ankles, 
his favourite nipping point when he caught you. He was a skilful game 
player who expected to win, would sulk if he did not, and had learnt the 
efficacy of feinting. When young, Birubi would have been happy I think 
to play games all day, but fortunately this desire waned a bit as he grew 
older. Even as an older wombat though he showed that he liked a game 
and had a sense  of humour. 
 
I was aways conscious of a dimension of mystery in my knowledge of 
Birubi’s mind. The sense of bridging a great gulf of difference was part 
of the magic of the relationship. I think it  was the centrality of the 
mother-child relationship to both our species and what was shared in its 
framework of ethics and expectations that made possible intimate 
contact with a creature so very different. This kind of  relationship is 
necessarily cast in communicative terms that disrupt the severely 
restricted vocabulary for describing animal behaviour and interaction 
allowed by reductionist science and its objectivist ideals of non-
relationship or its near approximation, subject-object relationship. 
Although you could entertain a large range of hypotheses about the 
meaning, complexity and specificity of his responses, that relationship, 
plus your knowledge of context and past interactions, usually suggested 
some credible and reasonably lucid tale about the other’s mental 
processes and attitudes that enabled you to continue relating as co-
actors in a partially shared narrative of the world. There were times, 
especially when he was an adolescent testing out his power, when I felt 
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my relationship with him was balanced on a knife edge, but as he 
matured it took on a less precarious form.  
 
Birubi, like other wombats and unlike dogs, was a resilient and 
determined animal who could not be shaped to human will. He did not 
recognise human superiority or pretensions to own the world and had a 
strong sense of his own independent selfhood, his own equal interests 
and entitlements. This stubbornness and sense of equality is the feature 
that has brought the wombat so strongly into conflict with the farmer, 
but to me it was wonderful. It meant that you were dealing with a real 
other, that contact had to be on his terms and not just on yours. 
Discipline, punishment and training to accept human will, of the sort we 
apply to dogs, were out of the question; not only would they be totally 
ineffective, but they would jeopardise the entire basis of relationship.  
 
Once you had recognised that he would not give way to you, you were 
motivated to find creative ways to work around conflict or to give way 
yourself. A corollary of his independence was his anger when thwarted. 
Birubi tended to get quite angry if shut out of the house or the vegie 
patch, would snort in a loud disgusted tone and sometimes retaliate 
destructively, for example by chewing the doormat or digging a big 
hole in front of the garden gate. As primarily a grass eater, he rarely did 
much harm in the vegie garden though (except for digging up the 
carrots). He did not usually hold a grudge for long, although there were 
a few occasions when he was still angry with me the next day for 
something I had done the day before.  
 
Wombats, being burrow dwellers, like a few home comforts. Birubi 
liked to sit (and in his latter days especially sleep) right in front of the 
wood stove in midwinter. He was fascinated by the fire and used to 
poke his nose right up against the hot glass until it hurt (something he 
never learnt not to do). He was very partial to a hot bum rub, and loved 
to stand in front of the stove rubbing his rear end against the warm 
corner. Birubi’s sexual expression began while he was still quite young 
and only subsided in the last few years of his life. He was erotically 
aroused by cushions, and would attempt to copulate with them after a 
15 minute foreplay period of savage biting. He was often absent for 
considerable periods, especially in the warmer months, and several 
times I came across him miles away. I speculate that he may have been 
away visiting wombat lovers. If so I hope he treated them better than he 
did the cushions.  
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Because wombats are solitary and do not form family groups, I know 
little of Birubi’s relationships with other wombats, with the exception of 
his male rival Clancy. Clancy lived about two kilometers away but 
would often come over for a feed and a fight. He was openly envious of 
Birubi’s privileges in relation to humans and wanted them for himself 
(and himself alone). Birubi had to face up to Clancy’s aggression when 
he was still a juvenile, and was valiant in the face of Clancy’s superior 
age, size and fighting skills. Nevertheless when I heard the sounds of 
warfare between Clancy and Birubi (a high pitched, harsh call), I would 
run out and try to separate the combatants and bring peace and light, 
but was sometimes unable to prevent the infliction of some nasty 
wounds, mainly to Birubi.  
 
The strife between Birubi and Clancy placed me in a painful conflict 
between wombat ethical systems and human ones. Should I give my 
favour to the stronger, as Clancy clearly hoped, or use my superior 
strength to help and sustain the ‘wombat son’ I was so attached to ? I 
found this a difficult moral dilemma, since Clancy was the indigenous 
occupant, but in the end resolved it in the same way as most human 
mothers, trying to honor commitment to protect the one near and dear 
to me while avoiding injustice towards his enemy.  
 
Birubi was wily, wary and tough, but the forest is a dangerous place. 
Sometimes Birubi’s fear of what lay outside the door was palpable. I 
could not protect him, and every time he left the house I knew that he 
might be badly injured or that I might never see him again. So the 
relationship was painful as well as joyful, just as it is for the many 
human mothers who are powerless to prevent harm to the children they 
love. Birubi was in great fear of dogs, the privileged gatekeeper animals 
who are allowed and even encouraged to terrorise the others, and he 
would often avoid my company, sometimes for a week or so, if I had 
been to lunch at the house of someone who owned a dog. (I think if 
people realised what terror and danger they cause to sensitive wild 
animals like Birubi and those who care about them they would be much 
more careful about owning and restraining dogs.) This is an example of 
the great depth of temporal understanding available to those who 
possess a well developed olfactory form of knowledge. 
 
Birubi was an intelligent herbivore, a vegetarian, I believe, in the full 
sense, both through his biological inheritance and through his 
convictions. As a non meat-eater myself, I had a rare opportunity to 
observe his opinions on meat eating when a friend came to stay 
bringing with them a dog they fed normally on fresh mutton on the 
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bone. I watched Birubi carefully inspecting and sniffing the site where 
the dog ate its flesh meals and examining a partly consumed bone. He 
gave every sign of horror, and came to the house only infrequently and 
with the greatest reluctance while the dog and the meat smell remained 
around. On another occasion, when I had fresh minced meat on my 
hands from feeding an injured juvenile magpie, he backed away from 
me  with obvious revulsion and did not return until several days later 
when the odour was gone.  
 
Reduced sexual expression was one of a number of signs of aging in 
Birubi’s last few years, which included the greying of his beautiful soft 
coat and the general reduction in his energy and vigour as indicated by 
his lessened interest in games and play. At age 13 he was one of the 
oldest wombats the wildcare people had heard of. I put this down 
mainly to my 5 kilometre distance from the nearest road, the automobile 
being such a major cause of wombat carnage. Wombats have been 
known to live to 25 years in captivity, and if Birubi aged prematurely in 
these terms it could reflect an unknown disease process or the extreme 
rigours of the early period of his life. 
 
I feel it was an incredible privilege to be allowed to know a free, wary 
and basically wild animal so intimately and richly. Our relationship cut 
across the usual boundary between the wild and domestic, the forest 
and the house, the nonhuman and the human, nature and culture. The 
‘culture’ world is understood to be a humanised world in which 
identities are assimilated to the human and conformed to human will, 
interests and standards. In this world the ‘good dog’ is part of human 
culture, trained to accept human dominance and human terms, (terms 
made possible by the canine social system to be sure but still set by 
humans), rather than to interact as an equal party bringing their own 
independent terms. On the other side, the ‘nature’ world is one we in 
the west tend now to see mainly through the instrumental and 
reductionist framework of ‘detached’ science that tries to delegitimate 
the rich personal knowledge of highly developed individual caring 
relationships. 
 
It is no coincidence that the more revolutionary forms of ethology 
pioneered by women like Jane Goodall have given us new insights 
precisely because they have broken these false choices down. Between 
them, the ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ frameworks rule out the possibility of 
deep personal contact with animals except on our terms. Birubi was a 
‘wild familiar’ who established his own terms for contact and 
friendship. It was an enormous thrill to explore forms of contact that 
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transgressed the nature/culture boundary, so constitutive of our 
civilisation. It was enchanting, the enchantment of childhood 
imagination and story, to walk side by side with Birubi along a forest 
track, to look up from my desk to find a forest-dwelling wombat sitting 
in my armchair by the fire. You had the courage and freedom to cross 
the boundary, Birubi. But do we ? 
 







Val Plumwood is author of Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. She is 
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Gender and Hybridity: the Significance 







n the wake of genetic and tissue engineering, two concepts which 
are deeply intertwined have acquired new connotations, not only in 
the field of science but also in the thick fabric of cultural beliefs and 
expectations which stem from the former and vice-versa; namely 
hybridity and purification. Discourses around the purity of the human 
species abound, and they help to maintain the separation between 
humans and between humans and nonhuman animals.  Birke and 
Michael,1 following Latour,2 call this process of keeping separate the 
human and nonhuman ‘purification’. This artificial separation 
perpetuates discourses and practices of  colonialism, racism and sexism, 
which extend to nonhuman animals through the process I call 
‘othering’, which is a desperate attempt at keeping the boundaries 
between ‘the self‘ and ‘the other’, intact. However, this constant policing 
of boundaries, which Latour sees as obsessive in modernity, covers up 
increasing anxieties over hybridity -- because, as Birke and Michael 
note: ‘[T]he notion of hybridity implies boundary -- crossing and mixing 
-- if not literally, then certainly at a conceptual level’.3 This would 
confuse, they suggest, issues of humanity, animality and even of 
individuality. We fear becoming part animal (a good example is fears 
expressed in debates around xenotransplantation) which would make 
us lose our ‘humanity’, our individuality, our sense of ‘self’.  
 
Bio-medical narratives of human-nonhuman animal hybridisation have 
played an important role in the raising of awareness about this 
phenomenon. However, I want to highlight the importance of these 
discourses in fictional narratives, such as fairy tales, fables and myths or 
                                                 
1 L. Birke and M. Michael, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Animal Bodies, Ethics, and Species 
Boundaries’, Society and Animals, 6/3, (1998), p.255.  
2 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hemstead, 
1993). 
3 L. Birke and M. Michael, ‘Hybrids, Rights, and Their Proliferation’, Animal Issues, 1/2, 
(1997), p.13. 
I 
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legends. This is particularly true of those works of literature classified as 
magic realism. Many cultures, such as the Greek, Roman and Latin 
American ones have attempted to make sense of the making of the 
world through historical accounts of their travels in which such 
hybridisation is part and parcel of those narratives.4 
 
It is precisely those cultural fears or beliefs about human-animal 
hybridity as expressed in the various genres of fiction I have mentioned 
above, that I explore in this article. I examine some of these 
representations from a feminist standpoint, particularly where they 
meet in representations of reproduction, a topic central to gender 
ideologies. Sarah Bakewell, in her analysis of images of bodily 
transformation, notes that ‘[p]eople have always been fascinated by 
stories of humans changing into animals, and animals behaving 
anthropomorphically’.5 She argues that these tales have to do with 
issues of human identity and that they are often ‘adapted to elicit either 
laughter or wide-eyed terror from the crowd around the campfire’.6 I 
could add to her argument that general public consumption of magic 
realist and science fiction texts suggests that these genres appeal to 
people precisely because the boundaries between fantasy and reality, 
humans and animals, are fluid and interchangeable and therefore help 
maintain cultural beliefs more or less intact. Moreover, I warn of the 
dangers of ignoring the cultural powers of these representations. 
 
 
Transgenic aliens, myths and ‘others’ 
 
 
Current public unease about cross species hybridity seems to invoke 
fictional monsters ranging from the Frankenstein story7 to bestial 
beings, such as men with dogs’ heads8 present in the collective memory 
                                                 
4 See, for example, P. Mason, Deconstructing America: Representations of the Other 
(Routledge, London, 1990). 
5 S. Bakewell, ‘Illustrations from the Wellcome Institute: Images of Bodily 
Transformation’, Medical History, 42/4, (1998), p.503. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Jon Turney, Frankenstein’s Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1998).  
8 In her reference to Pliny the Elder’s descriptions of his encounters with people of 
other races in his ‘armchair travels’ Sarah Bakewell comments that many of these 
descriptions invoked a mixture of animal and human. She quotes Pliny’s assertion that 
he encountered ‘men with dogs’ heads who are covered with wild beasts’ skin; they 
bark instead of speaking’. Bakewell, ‘Illustrations from the Wellcome Institute’, p.504. 
Bakewell presents us with a fascinating collection of images of hybridity reprinted with 
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and imagination of folktales around the world. This fear is part of the 
public response to recent experiments with transgenic organisms and 
xenotransplantation, which reflect public fears of science combined with 
ancient beliefs about the relationship between animals and humans -- 
especially when boundaries are transgressed in the literal creation of 
hybrids. If recipients of heart transplants believe that they might acquire 
characteristics of the donor,9 then what happens when the heart 
received is that of a pig?10 Does the recipient really believe that they will 
act ‘piggily’, grunt or worse be ‘re-born’ with a pig’s tail? Implicit here is 
the culturally-laden fear of becoming less human and more animal. 
 
These anxieties, however, may rest on the separation of humans and 
animals familiar to us in the modern world. But concomitantly, we seem 
also to have lost our myths, and thus a tool by which we could explain 
our role in the world around us, and which once helped us to 
understand incompatibilities between culture and nature. Rather, in 
Western culture, we have separated ourselves, created ourselves as 
superior to any other kinds of living organisms. We have become ‘the 
norm’ and anything else has become ‘the deviant’, ‘the monster’, ‘the 
other’. As Birke and Michael note, ‘[s]eparation and autonomy are 
defined against others - be they nonhuman animals, an ill-defined 
“nature”, or particularly excluded groups of human others’.11 
 
‘Otherness’ extends also to other human beings: the history of colonial 
conquest in Africa and the Americas relied on treating indigenous 
peoples as animals, as less than humans.12 Thus, ‘the savages’ often 
featured in touring shows in Europe. Edwards illustrates this point with 
some photographs and pamphlets from 1884 advertising a show of a 
                                                                                                                                  
permission of The Wellcome Institute in London. For more on this see her, ‘Illustrations 
from the Wellcome Institute’, pp.503-517.  
9 See S.H. Basch, ‘The Intrapsychic Integration of a New Organ: A Clinical Study of 
Kidney Transplantation’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 42, (1973), pp.364-84; R. Houser et al, 
‘Transplantation: Implications of the Heart Transplantation Process for Rehabilitation 
Counsellors’, Journal of Applied Rehabilitation Counselling, 23, (1992), pp.38-43. Also see 
L. Birke, Feminism and the Biological Body (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1999). 
10 See footnote 7 above.  
11 Birke and Michael, ‘The Heart of the Matter’, p.3. 
12 See Mason, Deconstructing America; E. Edwards (ed), Anthropology and Photography 
1860-1920 (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992); and L. Schiebinger, 
Nature’s Body: Sexual Politics and the Making of Modern Science (Pandora, London, 1993). 
Parallel to this, there was the construction of dichotomies of human/animal, 
rational/irrational which helped to create the narrative of inferior ‘others’ with respect 
to women, in which women are the closest to nature, the irrational ones, and men are 
the rational sentient superior beings. This, of course, allows violence and abuse against 
women, since they are somehow ‘inferior’ and ‘the others’. 
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group of Australian Aborigines who had been removed from 
Queensland and toured for public exhibition. One of these pamphlets 
has captions such as: 
 
First introduction in England of the band of seven 
Australian Boomerang Throwers consisting of male 
and female Queensland Black Trackers and Ranting 
Man Eaters! Veritable Blood-Thirsty Beasts, Lowest 
Order of Man.13  
 
Note the familiar discourse of animality: Blood-Thirsty Beasts, and so on. 
The photos feature a man and a woman, both naked from the waist up 
bearing their cultural ornaments such as tattoos and jewellery, and 
posing for the ‘white’ lens of R.A. Cunningham early in 1883. The 
separation from the ‘civilised’, thinking, speaking human is emphasised 
not only in the language used but also in the photographic 
representation of ‘race’ and difference. I must emphasise here that 
separation from animals is centrally part of Judeo-Christian heritage.14 
Modern Christianity demands individual moral responsibility, therefore 
separation from the collective responsibility for nature. Yet, this is quite 
recent in history;15 Christianity in Medieval times up to the nineteenth 
century held nonhuman animals morally responsible for ‘crimes’ such 
as thefts, chattering in church and even murder! (cf. Evans’s ‘trials of 
animals’). 
 
By contrast, hybrid forms, whatever their origins, threaten and 
unbalance that separation from ‘others’, hence the fears (ie we might 
become ‘others’) present in popular representations such as folktales, 
fables and myths. As I stated above, fear of hybrids is often expressed in 
fiction but especially in the genres of science fiction and magical realism. 
 
Before I launch into the hybrid characters present in fiction, I want to 
distinguish human-animal hybrids from allegorical, symbolical 
representations of human societal life through animals with human 
characteristics. We are all familiar with jokes and advertisements 
featuring animals dressed in human clothes and performing human 
activities such as male beavers ‘busy’ reading the newspaper whilst 
‘Mrs Beaver’ (a human female) speaks on the phone to some friend and 
                                                 
13 Edwards, Anthropology and Photography 1860-1920, p.53.  
14 See N. Newman, ‘Carnal Boundaries: The Commingling of Flesh in Theory and 
Practice’ in L. Birke and R. Hubbard (eds), Reinventing Biology: Respect for Life and the 
Creation of Knowledge (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995), pp.191-227.  
15 See J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Gerald Duckworth, London, 1974).  
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says: ‘No, he’s not busy ... in fact, that whole thing is just a myth’.16 The 
popularity of Gary Larson’s Far Side cartoons illustrates this point. 
 
‘[I]f we meet with imagery that seems to be calling us to look beyond 
the immediate event and its emotional ramifications, we may suspect 
we are dealing with symbol or allegory’, writes Alice Landy.17 Allegory 
usually carries moral teachings through animal characters with human 
qualities. Some writers such as George Orwell have gone a step further 
in their use of allegory in order to denounce how the politics of 
language ‘may lose its humane meanings under the pressure of political 
bestiality and falsehood’.18 His Animal Farm is an example, in which pigs, 
horses, donkeys and farm birds plot revolution against the cruelty of 
human beings. Pigs in Orwell’s story use their ‘politics of language’ to 
convince the other animals on the farm that, under their guidance, the 
world (the farm) will change for the better and that they will all live in a 
utopian society of equality and respect. But in doing so, they acquire 
negative human passions, and so the circle starts again. The farm 
animals attend meetings called by the pigs; these plot against each other 
and even kill any of their fellow animals who might oppose them. Does 
this sound disturbingly familiar? 
 
Traditional fairy tales also use animal characters in this way; who can 
forget the wicked wolf in Red Riding Hood, or the cunning cat in The Cat 
in Boots, for example? Mainstream as well as feminist literary critics 
have analysed allegories and symbols present in these stories in depth, 
particularly when it comes to warning girls of the dangers of going out 
alone in the woods or at dark, or of getting pregnant outside marriage.19 
However, they have paid less attention to hybrid characters and their 
meaning in terms of the cultural fears about becoming less than 
humans.  
 
Human/animal hybrids in myths, also help justify human dominance 
over anything that is not human. Ironically, though, some humans 
create ‘powerful’, mythical hybrids to keep other humans in fear and, 
                                                 
16 G. Larson, The Far Side Gallery 3 (Universal Press Syndicates, New York, 1988), p.65.  
17 A. Landy, The Heath Introduction to Literature (D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 
MA, 1996), p.435.  
18 George Steiner, ‘The Hollow Miracle’ in D. Walder (ed), Literature in the Modern 
World: Critical Essays and Documents (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990), p.346. 
(My emphasis).  
19 See, for example, C. Pinkola Estes, Women Who Run with the Wolves: Contacting the 
Power of the Wild Woman (Rider, London, 1992); J. Zipes, The Brothers Grimm 
(Routledge, London, 1988) and R. Cosslett, ‘Fairytales: Revising the Tradition’ in T. 
Cosslett et al (eds), Women, Power and Resistance: An Introduction to Women’s Studies 
(Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1996), pp.81-90.  
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consequently, under control. Take, for example, the familiar 
mythological -- as well as a Christian character present in the Bible -- 
hybrid known as Satan, named from an Arabic word meaning 
adversary. Satan personifies evil. Originally an angel who rebels against 
the creator, he is punished  expelled from heaven, and given animal 
parts. Satan is usually conceived of as red, the colour of fire and blood, a 
man with horns, a pointed tail, and cloven hoofs for feet, but older 
representations emphasise his bestial qualities - showing him as a goat, 
for example, which is closely associated with lechery and sexual 
appetite. This, in the folk concept of Satan, would explain his 
supposedly raping of women and consequently, the reproduction of 
monstrous beings. Since reproduction is heavily gendered, the fears and 
the guilt about the reproduction of these ‘monsters’, falls almost always 
on the shoulders of women. These fears, as well as ideas about 
motherhood, fatherhood, religion, and the control of reproduction tend 
to pop up, more often than not, in popular literature, such as magazines, 
newspaper articles, fairytales, and novels particularly science fiction 
stories. 
 
By the same token, we can say that the future of reproduction is also 
about the future of women and therefore of gender. My interest in this 
topic, as a feminist writer and sociologist, stems from my perception of 
people’s preoccupation with human-non human animal relationships 
expressed through folktales and myths,20 all of which are gendered. 
These myths then influence  not only literature but also science.  
  
It is in the intersection between myth, literature and science, that science 
fiction writers are able to explore themes of reproduction and hybridity. 
An example of this is the film Alien Resurrection. Here, Ripley, the main 
protagonist, is impregnated with the alien’s genes to become after 
several failed attempts at cloning her, a hybrid, with all the monstrous 
                                                 
20 I consider ‘myth’ as a branch of the folktale. If we think that myths usually explore 
the world as it was in some past age before the present conditions were established, 
then we can say that they handle creation and origins. When myth deals with 
adventures of the gods, we might say that they are almost identical with the fairy tale 
in that human communications happen through women, who become the ‘others’ and 
the ‘objects’ of economic and kinship exchange. Folktales have an oral tradition which 
is generally reproduced by women in the bedside stories they tell their children 
without realising that, in the process of retelling folktales, they are also reproducing 
their own alterity. The Anthology of World Mythology comments that: ‘In the 20th 
century, the symbolic interpretation of myths moved from the external environment to 
the internal environment of the unconscious mind. Sigmund Freud and his followers 
view myths as the expression of the individual’s unconscious wishes, fears and drives’. 
D. Rosenberg, World Mythology: An Anthology of the Great Myths and Epics (Harrap, 
London, 1986), p.xix.  
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characteristics of her alien parent (corrosive acid instead of blood, 
enormous strength and extreme insensitivity towards human suffering), 
yet in the body of Ripley. In turn, she is ‘adopted’ by a mutant baby 
alien which she later pushes through the suction duct, in a clever 
allegory for abortion. As the mutant baby disintegrates, his/her terrified 
face and eyes become almost human and the cries of agony resemble 
that of a human baby. Ripley sacrificed her adoptive baby to save Earth 
like the Virgin Mary allowing  Christ, her ‘alien’ son - for being only 
partly human - to die for the whole of humanity. Thus, the film plays 
with ancient fears of hybridity through women’s reproduction. 
 
Inbreeding as a source of hybrids is another culturally gendered belief 
originating in creation stories and myths. Whoever the creators are in 
different cultures, they are always warning humans of the terrible 
consequences of having sexual intercourse with close relatives: we could 
bear animals or a mixture of human/non-human animal. People have 
taken this a step further and included the dangers of practising sexual 
intercourse with non-human animals, as if animals wanted to engage in 
such ‘practices’ with humans!21 Nevertheless, many oral folktales have 
featured women being ‘raped’ by all sort of animals including snakes 
and then giving birth to hybrids. This is particularly true of  Latin 
American folktales. Not surprisingly, then, the topic of women’s fear of 
giving birth to monsters who are neither human nor animals - yet are 








Although magic realism, as a literary term, has been mainly used to 
describe the works of many Latin American writers, it can also be said 
that a number of European novelists22 incorporate magic realism in their 
works of fiction. These novels ‘explore the unexpected, supernatural 
and fantastic within a realistic frame of reference’.23  The genre ‘typically 
                                                 
21 This is also, of course, a violation of animal rights.  
22 Among many others in this genre, I can mention: Angela Carter, Emma Tennant, 
Salman Rushdie, John Fowles, Elsa Morante and Fabrizia Ramondino. 
23 C. Buck (ed), Bloomsbury Guide to Women’s Literature (Bloomsbury, London, 1992), 
p.771.  
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incorporates elements of dream, fantasy, myth and fairytale within 
ostensibly realist narratives’.24 
 
Magical realism as is also known, ‘has become an almost universal 
description of the ‘Latin American style’ - exotic and tropical, 
overblown and unrestrained, phantasmagorical and hallucinatory - it is 
so ideologically dangerous that it should really be rejected’, asserts 
Martin in his analysis of Latin American fiction.25 This has helped it gain 
world recognition through novelists such as Angela Carter in Europe, 
Alejo Carpentier, Gabriel García Márquez and Isabel Allende, to 
mention just a few in the Americas. But magic realist fiction has also 
helped record cultural beliefs including many regarding scientific, 
biomedical concepts. In Latin America these beliefs are refracted 
through discourses of masculinity and femininity expressed as the 
ideologies of machismo and marianismo.26 The latter stems from a 
fusion of the Spanish Catholic dogma of the Virgin Mary (a pure, 
unblemished young woman) with the indigenous concept of 
motherhood, which includes Pachamama, Mother Earth (more than a 
human being, in fact a goddess) according to Aymara myths.27 This 
blending of religion and paganism in gendered discourses of 
motherhood is in itself a hybrid, as is the mestizaje that came from the 
mixing of  Spanish and indigenous genes. In this context, Latin 
American literature is fertile ground for hybrid forms of all sorts and 
both writers and readers find this phenomenon of b(l)ending rules, 
norms, cultures, myths and beliefs in general, very ‘natural’ indeed. 
 
Gabriel García Márquez, if not the ‘creator’ of magical realism in Latin 
America, has been the first Latin American28 writer to give magical 
realism world recognition with his novel One Hundred Years of Solitude.29 
Generally, readers like the novel ‘because it appears to conjure up a 
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 G. Martin, Journeys Through the Labyrinth: Latin American Fiction in the Twentieth 
Century (Verso, London, 1989), p.141.  
26 See J. Fisher, Out of the Shadows: Women, Resistance and the Politics in South America 
(Latin American Bureau, London, 1993) and also C. Rivera-Fuentes, ‘They do not 
Dance Alone: Latin American Women’s Movements’ in Cosslett, Women, Power and 
Resistance.  
27 Aymaras are indigenous people who live on the borders of Chile, Peru and Bolivia, 
therefore influencing all three countries with their culture.  
28 Alejo Carpentier and Miguel Angel Asturias are, according to literary critics, the first 
Latin American writers to explore magic realist fiction in their novels after returning 
from Paris where they encountered surrealism (See, for example, Martin, Journeys 
through the Labyrinth). 
29 G. García Márques, One Hundred Years of Solitude (Picador, London, 1978).   
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magical reality’.30 There is in the novel a blending of reality and fantasy 
which makes it difficult for the reader to say where one begins or ends. 
Significantly, the boundaries between humans and animals are fluid and 
interchangeable, and not always just allegorical. 
 
Briefly, the novel is a synopsis of  Latin American historical experience 
as seen through the life and eyes of the Buendía family. José Arcadio 
Buendía and some others set out to find an outlet to the sea. Eventually, 
after 26 months they abandoned the expedition and founded Macondo. 
I am struck by the parallel here with Columbus and his expedition to 
the Indias which, took him instead to the coast of Latin America.31 
However, it is as the Buendías’ story unfolds that we encounter the first 
mention of hybridity:  
 
To the south lay the swamps, covered with an 
eternal vegetable scum, and the whole vast universe 
of the great swamp, which according to what the 
gypsies said, had no limits. The great swamp in the 
west mingled with a boundless extension of water 
where there were soft-skinned cetaceans that had 
the head and torso of a woman, causing the 
ruination of sailors with the charm of their 
extraordinary breasts.32 
 
Fantasy and reality fuse here such that the reader simply accepts the 
fantastic narration as reality in the story, though the allusion to the 
mythological siren (or mermaid) is clear. Within Greek mythology, this 
sea nymph lured sailors on to rocks by her singing, resulting in cultural 
beliefs, widespread from medieval times until the 18th century in 
Europe. So the writer creates or invokes a mythical figure like the 
mermaid to call our attention to the fact that Latin America is a place 
where indigenous and occidental cultures mix sexually, indeed inbreed, 
to produce mestizaje, hybridisation. In other words, the significance here 
of a mythological character like the siren is that Márquez is playing with 
the Western belief that mixing with ‘uncivilised’/indigenous women 
would cause the ‘ruination’ of a ‘civilized’, superior group of people, in 
this case the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores. What I find 
fascinating is that Márquez seems to be conveying that it was the 
colonisers who ‘ruined’ the original inhabitants of the Latin American 
continent by mixing with them, usually through the methodic raping of 
women albeit excusing themselves by saying that it was because of ‘the 
                                                 
30 Martin, Journeys through the Labyrinth, p.224.  
31 Cf P. Mason, Deconstructing America 
32 Márques, One Hundred Years of Solitude, p.16.  
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charm of their breasts’. As I commented above, the figure of the siren is 
not a modern creation. Anthropologist Peter Mason refers, for example, 
to Columbus’ letters to Luis de Santangel in 1493 in which the explorer 
reports that on the islands of the Caribs ‘he saw three sirens, although 
they were not as beautiful as he had been led to believe’.33 
 
The fantastic being in the shape of a siren in A Hundred Years of Solitude, 
comes as no surprise, then, since the foundation of Macondo, has clear 
undertones with the colonisation and foundation of Hispanic towns in 
America. In Márquez’s text, however, the mermaid’s singing is 
substituted by her alluring breasts perhaps a less subtle sexual discourse 
on fears of reproducing with the ‘wrong’ species. 
 
Interestingly, Mason also mentions Columbus’ comments in his letters 
that on this island of the Caribs ‘people with tails are born’.34  
Interesting, because this further example of hybridity also appears in 
One Hundred Years. The original couple, José Arcadio Buendía and his 
cousin Ursula Iguaran delay the consummation of their marriage 
because of her fear of incest which could bring about the bearing of 
iguanas instead of human children. Also, note the name Ursula Iguaran, 
which can be said to be, again, one of Márquez’s subtle jokes:  Could 
Urs(ul)a, if deconstructed, mean a female bear and Igua(r)a(n), iguana? 
Maybe my deconstruction is extreme and bears (excuse the pun) no 
relation to the author’s intentions, yet as a writer myself I feel tempted 
to see beyond the obvious; after all, other names in the story are laden 
with meaning (cf for example, Buendía (Good day in Spanish). But 
going back to incest and inbreeding, the story of Ursula and José 
Arcadio Buendía is such that: 
 
Although their marriage was predicted from the 
time they had come into the world, when they 
expressed their desire to be married their own 
relatives tried to stop it. They were afraid that those 
two healthy products of two races that had 
interbred over the centuries would suffer the same 
shame of breeding iguanas.35 
 
To make this fear more believable, Márquez introduces a further, more 
‘real’ example: 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p.102.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., pp.23-4.  
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There had already been a horrible precedent. An 
aunt of Ursula’s, married to an uncle of José 
Arcadio Buendía, had a son who went through life 
wearing loose, baggy trousers and who bled to 
death after having lived forty-two years in the 
purest state of virginity, for he had been born and 
grown up with a cartilaginous tail in the shape of a 
corkscrew and with a small tuft of hair on the tip. A 
pig’s tail that was never allowed to be seen by any 
woman and that cost him his life when a butcher 
friend did him the favour of chopping it off with his 
cleaver.36 
 
It  is up to Ursula to stop incest by wearing chastity pants for a year, 
despite her cousin’s efforts to consummate the marriage. This symbolic 
birth control reflects Latin American gender roles in which women are 
to control reproduction at any cost whilst men are to prove their 
manhood by sleeping around indiscriminately, the proof of which is 
children. When this virility is put into doubt by other men, they blame 
their women. In the novel, after winning a cockfight, José Arcadio is 
ridiculed by the angry loser thus: 
 
Congratulations!, he shouted, Maybe that rooster of 
yours can do your wife a favour.37 
 
On hearing this, José Arcadio kills the other man with a spear in front of 
the whole town, goes back to his house and orders Ursula to take the 
chastity pants off whilst threatening her with the spear. Ursula 
responds: 
 
You’ll be responsible for what happens.38 
 
To which he retorts:  
 
If you bear iguanas, we’ll raise iguanas.  But there’ll 
be no more killings in this town because of you.39  
 
He not only reproaches Ursula for his blemished macho image but also, 
and more infuriatingly for me as a female reader, blames her for a 
murder he himself committed and for the potentiality of hybrids 
through her reproduction (which reminds me of the blaming of women 
                                                 
36 Could this be a symbolic penis? 
37 Márques, One Hundred Years of Solitude, p.25.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid. 
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for bearing daughters). This is the archetype of Latin American 
machismo.  
 
A further and last example of hybridity present in One Hundred Years,  
which unlike the two previous ones, has no connections to fears of 
reproduction and inbreeding is that of a snake-man being toured in a 
cage by the gipsies in Macondo. The narrator recounts: 
 
[T]he crowd ... was witnessing the sad spectacle of 
the man who had been turned into a snake for 
having disobeyed his parents.40 
 
The ‘spectacle’ is peculiarly similar to the aborigines on display 
mentioned earlier. In that show, it was difference which had to be 
exhibited, emphasised and played against the ideological constructs of 
civilisation. In this show, the fears are to do with being ‘unnatural’. 
Disobedience to one’s parents in Latin American culture goes against 
the ‘natural’, ‘normal’ behaviour and rules dictated by religious 
ideologies. Malformation of one’s spirit is punishable and ‘corrected’ 
through some divine intervention, which draws parallels to scientific 
intervention to amend physical deformities, even when they present no 
threat of death to the ‘abnormal’ person.41  
 
Modern genetic engineering now gives us the possibility of creating 
further ‘unnatural’ forms of hybrids between humans and other animals 
that were hitherto imaginable only in fiction. Feminist historian of 
science, Donna Haraway, exploring the interweaving of science-fiction 
and modern genetics, remarks that on learning about Christian 
salvation stories she has been ‘a marked woman informed by those 
literacies as well as those given to [her] by birth and education’.42 She 
also notes the potential scientific creation of fantastic and exotic hybrid 
forms through genetic engineering which evoke precisely those cultural 
themes. Writing about OncoMouseTM, the patented mouse bearing the 
gene for (human) breast cancer, Haraway comments: 
 
                                                 
40 I can’t but help make connections to the Christian creation story of Adam, Eve and 
the snake in the Garden of Eden.  
41 For example, geneticists might attempt to intervene to improve the ‘normal’, to give 
the human body qualities beyond those given by nature. However, they first 
experiment with animals, since animals are constructed as dispensable and inferior to 
humans.   
42 D. Haraway, Modest_Witness@ Second_Millennium. FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouseTM: 
Feminism and Technoscience (Routledge, New York, 1997), p.2. 
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OncoMouseTM is my sibling, and more properly, 
male or female, s/he is my sister. Her essence is to 
be a mammal, a bearer by definition of mammary 
glands, and a site for the operation of a 
transplanted, human, tumour-producing gene - an 
oncogene - that reliably produces breast cancer. 
Although her promise is decidedly secular, s/he is 
a figure in the sense developed within Christian 
realism: S/he is our scapegoat; s/he bars our 
suffering; s/he signifies and enacts our mortality in 
a powerful, historically specific way that promises a 
culturally privileged kind of salvation - a “cure for 
cancer”.43 
 
The imagery interweaving the fantasies of science-fiction and scientific 
fact is powerfully explored by Lynn Randolph in her painting of a 
human-mouse hybrid, created in response to Haraway’s paper ‘Mice 
into Wormholes’.44 The painting features a being which has the body of 
a female mouse (with human looking breasts, hands and feet). She is 
sitting inside a box, like a cage, observed by seven pairs of human eyes 
as she stares out at the viewer. Significantly, she is crowned with thorns, 
like Jesus Christ, supposedly to save humanity from cancer. Haraway 
also makes this point when she comments that: 
 
[Randolph’s OncoMouse] is a [Christ] figure in the 
sacred-secular dramas of technoscientific salvation 
history, with all the disavowed links to Christian 
narrative that pervade U.S. scientific discourse.45 
 
What I want to emphasise is the reproductive aspect,  not only of 
oncogenes, which gender this hybrid (by suggesting with a sole image 
of a breasted human-mouse, that the hybrid is somehow female) created 
by genetic engineering and which play into cultural fears of hybrids and 
of women being the ones to reproduce them. Scientists (usually male) 
play God to create a monster which can ‘save’ us. But to do that, they 
must have their victim, their ‘scapegoat’ as Haraway puts it. They must  
impregnate a female mouse, with the diseased gene of a human, the 
‘superior’, the ‘creator’ in order to save the rest of humanity from the 
awful disease called cancer. Even if we accept the argument that the 
creation of OncoMouse is justified to save humanity, this glosses over 
the creation of many other experimental hybrid forms (all of which will 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p.79.  
44 Lynn Randolph’s painting is entitled ‘The Laboratory, or The Passion of 
OncoMouse’.  
45 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p.47.  
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be murdered in the name of science).46 Here, there is a clear hint of the 
phantasmagorical, something between reality and surreality, between 
life and death, which is extremely disturbing for some women, since the 
cross,47 the cruza continues to fall on our shoulders. 
 
Thus, the fears/anxieties about hybridity, reproduction and gender so 
eloquently expressed by writers such as García Márquez, Angela Carter, 
and Carol Emshwiller are evoked again by the literal creation of hybrids 
in science. Carter’s Nights at the Circus48 follows a female hybrid (she is 
the daughter of a male swan and a woman and is called Fevvers, 
possibly because of her wings and also because of her working class 
origin) on a circus tour from London to Siberia. This is certainly a novel 
in which magical realism and gender intersect; as the Bloomsbury Guide 
to Women’s Literature rightly asserts: 
 
Gender identities are positioned within an 
interrogation of cultural mythologies of gender, as 
well as a question of the whole problem of 
“authenticity”: Am I fact or fiction? asks Fevvers.49 
  
As for Emshwiller, her novel Carmen Dog50 is one in which animals turn 
into women, while women mutate into birds and other animals. At 
some point in the process of mutating they are hybrids and we read 
about women like giant sloths 
 
upside down in the lower branches of a tree. Some 
are, you know, on the way up, others the reverse. 
As I said: woman to beast, beast to woman, and not 
much point to it all seems to me.51 
 
I will not go into the symbolism of this science fiction novel but what is 
clear from the beginning is that men find it difficult to understand 
womens’ change and try, of course, to control the whole process in the 
name of reason and attempt to lead a ‘normal’ life with their hybrid 
wives and lovers. 
 
                                                 
46 This has clear resonance with the fate of the hybrids (including the cloned Ripley) in 
the film Alien Resurrection.  
47 I am playing here with the religious and scientific meaning of ‘cross’ which also 
means ‘hybrid’ in Spanish (just as ‘cross-breeding’ is used in English). 
48 A. Carter, Nights at the Circus (Vintage Classics, London, 1994).  
49 Buck, Bloomsbury Guide to Women’s Literature, p.861. 
50 C.Emshwiller, Carmen Dog (The Women’s Press, London, 1988). 
51 Ibid., p.1. 
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Whatever scientists believe transgenes can do, the fear of bodily forms 
that transgress species boundaries (in Randolph’s picture, half woman, 
half mouse) runs deep in our culture. That is why the picture disturbs. It 
touches on possibilities which are more than just fictional. It evokes 
fears that science can now create the very fantastical forms which were 
hitherto the prerogative of the novelist or storyteller. 
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It was an overcast, November day, cool and still. A good day for a walk 
along the gravel roads in rural Virginia where I live. I had been 
struggling with words all day, trying to find them, tame them, use them. 
The act of walking calmed me; the cool air filling my lungs, refreshed.  
 
As I rounded a bend in the road, I felt myself being watched. I looked 
up and saw an odd-looking creature eyeing me from the crook of two 
bare branches. I studied the long white oval face, the narrow slanted 
eyes lined in black, the pink nose, the rounded black ears with pink 
tops. It didn't look quite real, more like the face of a plush toy, or a 
novelty balloon. For a moment I thought it might be a stuffed animal 
that someone had put in the tree as a joke. But as I advanced it moved 
the tiniest bit, keeping its beady eyes on me. 
 
Except for that small flicker of movement, the possum was as still as the 
tree itself, not even blinking. I met its gaze, keeping myself just as still. I 
noted its leathery tail curled like a hook, like an upside down question 
mark. I wondered if I had surprised it, this nocturnal animal, now 
trapped in daylight, and whether it was terrified.  
 
I could feel the possum studying me as well, though it remained as still 
as stone. It was amazing, really, the two of us facing each other across 
the huge divide of our separate species. “Hello”, I said in a low voice. “I 
won’t hurt you”.  
 
I sensed that it understood, though not from my words. Some other 
language ran between us, a language of gesture and scent, perhaps. I 
thought of how we must smell, we big galumphing humans with our 
sweat and soaps and perfumes, as we thump and thrash our way 
through their woods. Does danger have a particular scent, I wondered, 
something other than normal human scent? I imagined hunters as 
giving off a hot red peppery scent, the walker a more benign one, like 
salt. Surely the possum could smell my good intentions, or at least, my 
lack of bad ones.  
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I realized, then, that the possum must have been aware of me long 
before I had become aware of it. It had been unlucky enough to be 
caught in the open, but why had it not run off? Why had it stayed there, 
locking me in its gaze?  
 
Native Americans believe that animals choose to show themselves to 
humans, so that humans can learn from them. Perhaps the possum had 
shown itself to me on purpose, wanting to teach me something. How 
lacking and insignificant words seemed now! 
 
All around me, I could hear the low twittering of birds, things rustling 
off under the trees. They were tiny sounds, sounds I probably would not 
have heard if I were not then as still as the possum. I wondered how 
many other creatures were watching me, watching this little drama 
unfold. I imagined them peering out from burrows, from rocks, from 
behind and over tree trunks. 
 
I felt acutely aware, then, of the whole teeming animal and bird and 
insect world, that enormous parallel universe that goes on side by side 
with the human one, though most of the time we are barely aware of it. 
Here, I was the intruder, the outsider, “other”. I felt a sudden piercing 
desire to know that world, to see it through those thousands of eyes 
peering out from the trees and leaf mold, to know how it must be to 
experience the world wordlessly, through eye, ear, and nose.  
 
The possum continued to watch me, and I, it. I knew that it would stay 
this way for as long as I met its gaze - for hours, if necessary. But my 
fingers were frozen, my leg muscles stiffening; it was time to go home. I 
bent down to fix my shoelace, and when I stood up the possum was 
gone. I had heard nothing, not even the faintest rustle; it had slipped 
away, as silently as an apparition. 
 
All the way home I peered into the trees, looking for faces. I saw none. 
But I knew they were there, watching. Another would eventually show 
itself, some brave ambassador come to remind us that we are not alone 
here, that the human world is not everything, that another, larger world 
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Peter Singer, Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights 
Movement, 222pp., Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1999. 
 
 
Henry’s work can teach us how to make our ethical views become more 
than words – how to put them into action, so that they have an impact 
on the world. It is hard to imagine anything more important than that. 
(Peter Singer, from the Preface). 
 
 
In many ways, Peter Singer’s recent foray into biography, Ethics Into 
Action, can be read as a manual for those who were moved by Animal 
Liberation and wanted to take some action to prevent the unnecessary 
suffering of non-human animals. Singer’s approach is to illustrate how 
abstract ethical ideas can be applied in the real world and effect change, 
by way of example: his subject is the late animal rights activist, Henry 
Spira. 
 
Spira, born in 1927, emerged from a tumultuous and difficult childhood 
to embark on a varied career as a merchant marine, a private in the 
United States Army, a teacher at a poor New York City public school 
and finally a full time activist. His early interests in activism and 
involvement in various socialist organisations caught the attention of 
the FBI, who for some time kept Spira under surveillance and 
documented his movements.  
 
Spira’s interest in animal issues really began when he read a review of 
Singer’s Animal Liberation, and came to see defence of animal interests as 
a logical extension of his interests in the rights and interests of human 
beings. Once committed to the cause of action on behalf of his non-
vocal, non-human counterparts, Spira, through strategic planning, 
creativity and sheer relentlessness, achieved some astounding victories 
over individuals and organisations involved in animal exploitation. 
Given the widespread impact of behaviourism in science and the social 
norms of the period (beginning in the early seventies, when the term 
‘animal liberation’ was often interpreted as a parody of the women’s 
liberation movement, for example), Spira faced formidable opposition. 
Any reader interested in animal issues will be fascinated by Singer’s 
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accounts of Spira’s successes, among them his contribution to 
preventing the notorious Draize-test through careful negotiation with 
major cosmetics companies (most notably, Revlon). 
 
To those with an interest in the animal rights movement, Ethics Into 
Action lends an important historical perspective, but some will be 
disappointed that animal interests and suffering come across as means 
to an end: a meaningful life for the human beings in question. In the 
sense that Singer is presenting Spira’s life as a case in point, one has the 
sense that Singer’s conception of a meaningful life is unfortunately 
narrow, and this is the major weakness of the book. 
 
Whilst Spira, who eventually devotes himself to the liberation of 
animals on a full-time basis, is presented as leading a meaningful life 
devoted to ethical concerns, Singer neglects to address alternative but 
perhaps equally valid lives of other persons discussed within the book 
in relation to ethics. Spira’s father, we are told, methodically committed 
a covered-up suicide in order that his wife and daughters 
(intermittantly institutionalised for depression) could survive on his life 
insurance payments. ‘He literally gave up his life for my mother and 
sister’, says Spira (p. 42). Like Spira, his father was trying to prevent the 
suffering of those who could not protect or care for themselves, and yet 
this morally and ethically significant act is treated by Singer as a mere 
episode in Spira’s life.  
 
Similarly, Spira’s life is presented by Singer as that of a model animal 
liberationist. In contrast, other individuals or groups seen to clash with 
Spira are presented as hindering the ‘good’ work he did. Though this 
may be the case, Singer does not give the reader the opportunity to 
judge for him or herself, and thus one has the distinct uneasy feeling 
that the account is biased in Spira’s favour. One is also constantly 
reminded of Singer’s own influence on Spira through Animal Liberation 
(chapter four is entitled ‘Animal Liberation’ and opens with a quotation 
from Singer’s book), yet the book is lacking a philosophical assessment 
of the utilitarian approach shared by Spira and Singer. Perhaps it is 
unrealistic to expect Singer to be critical of what is essentially his own 
position, given that his ‘argument’ for it is presented in Animal 
Liberation. Nonetheless, when it comes to the biography of Spira, Singer 
must realise that these views are not uncontroversial. Ethics Into Action 
simply suggests that these views work and that by adopting them and 
devoting our time to reducing suffering, we automatically accrue vital 
meaning in our lives.  
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What is needed are argument and explanation, and more discussion 
about what constitutes “meaning”. According to Singer, it appears to be 
physical and mental health and happiness – again, this is 
uncontroversial, and tends to beg the question.  
 
Given that the text is presented as exploring ethical questions, it comes 
as a surprise that Spira’s methods are not questioned. He displayed an 
uncanny ability to negotiate with large corporations in order to effect 
change, but a potential criticism of this approach is that Spira was 
success-driven and not principle-driven. Thus he would attempt to 
work in conjunction with those corporations he was accusing of animal 
exploitation, in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome. The 
approach has the merit of being realistic, but Singer does not adequately 
weigh up its merits and defects, leaving it vulnerable to the criticism 
that he potentially jeopardised the animal rights movement in its 
embryonic stages by not taking a strong enough position. Singer could 
have provided more philosophical discussion regarding this issue. 
Instead, his ‘Advice to Activists’ is entirely derived from Spira’s 
methodology, as if this is ethically unproblematic. 
 
Singer struggles to straddle the twin genres of biography and 
philosophy. Unfortunately I don’t think he is successful: as biography 
the account of Spira is rather brief and selective, as well as being one-
sided. In some ways this may be a case of the author being too close to 
give an objective and well-rounded account of the subject and his 
concerns. As philosophy, too many assumptions are left unexplored, 
unjustified or unacknowledged, and Singer tends to feed the reader his 
own views without challenging them. Though the emphasis is on 
“action”, the ethical component is disappointing in its lack of depth and 
its one sidedness. The book could almost be renamed ‘Animal Liberation 
into Action’. 
 
To his merit, Singer has chosen a fascinating subject – Spira’s is a 
forceful and colourful persona, and the politics behind the animal rights 
movement provides high drama (conflict, corruption, misappropriation 
of funds and even – though very much an aside – murder). Readers will 
enjoy the complex ‘plot’ of this biography, and Spira does present an 
inspiring example (though not necessarily a blueprint) for activists. 
Nevertheless, one is left with the feeling that the book, from an ethical 
perspective, could only have been enriched by the presence of some 
critical discussion of Spira’s philosophy and life, insofar as this is an 
example of an ethical existence. 
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Randy Malamud, Reading Zoos: Representations of Animals and Captivity, xi 




Are zoos texts? Not precisely – and so Randy Malamud, an English 
professor at Georgia State University (USA), purports to 'read' them 
through their stories (ie fictional accounts that feature zoo scenes, 
inhabitants, or visitors). Finding in this way little if any redeeming value 
in the institution, and much that is objectionable, Malamud writes a 
staunchly abolitionist denunciation; indeed, his work of literary/moral 
criticism borders on the polemical. Caveat lector, in other words, for here 
hermeneutics of suspicion drive the argument: ‘if we examine the 
evidence and documents of our own culture, through our 
representations of zoos, I believe that the inconsistencies, the 
hypocrisies, the logical fallacies, and the rationalizations that have 
undergirded the perpetuation of zoos will become readily apparent; the 
system will deconstruct (p. 49). 
 
Under Malamud’s critical lens, zoo stories manifest many defects of 
their subject. As seen through scores of authors’ eyes, zoos originate in 
imperialistic impulses (melding conquest and captivity, exhibition and 
exploitation), establish a regime of cruelty that oppresses by depriving 
wild animals of their freedom and by inflicting painful somatic stress, 
and encourage practices of spectatorship that stultify visitors and rob 
inter-species encounters of elemental reciprocity. Given this list of ills, it 
should not be surprising that Malamud decries the urban weekend 
ritual of taking kids to the zoo. There is nothing innocent or amusing 
about such outings: ‘zoos prove well-suited as a vehicle for children’s 
anxiety, fear, insecurity; zoos evoke these unsettling psychological 
reactions more prominently than they inspire (as zoo proponents would 
proclaim) fun, education, or imagination’ (p. 293). 
 
Stark stuff, this. Some readers may not persevere through Malamud’s 
long, dark discourse. But then the history and legacy of the zoo is itself 
long and dark. So sour a view of the institution may be unexpected, 
especially for those who have subscribed to the popular, received 
metaphor of zoo-as-ark of conservation/education. On the other hand, 
philosophers and cultural critics ought not be strangers to mismatches 
of ideological rhetoric and phenomenological reality. And such is the 
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pattern at the structural heart of the zoological park - the central 
contradiction revealed by Malamud is that even whilst they proclaim to 
save wild animals, zoos actually extinguish biotic wildness both by 
dislocating their keep and by overexposing them. Unauthenticity of this 
sort deserves a thoroughgoing treatment of skeptical analysis. 
 
Reading Zoos delivers that and unfortunately more, as its skepsis spills 
over into a cynicism that sometimes obscures. There is a tendency in this 
book, for instance, toward diagnostic totalization–negative judgments 
are issued with the aprioristic ring of cant: ‘inevitably, commercial 
culture will overshadow nature, replicating the dominance of imperial 
culture over the subaltern’ (p. 97, italics added); ‘the cage essentially and 
wholly defines, subordinates, whatever is inside’ (p. 119, italics added). 
Similarly, polarities of global reasoning arise when, as Malamud seeks 
to distinguish ‘the authentically enlightening intellectual experience of 
animals’ from the distress visited upon animals at zoos, he ends up 
posing the empirical difference as a dichotomy of principles: 
‘imagination indicates creation, and pain deconstructs creation’ (p. 181). 
Is the imagination never delusory, one wonders, or pain ever 
ennobling? Maybe not, but the author's declamatory tone bespeaks a 
refusal to ponder the former's pitfalls or the latter's generative 
possibilities. Lastly, cultural cynicism again overcomes Malamud as he 
offers to explain the popularity of zoos by positing a social addiction, 
and so we are told that families frequently find themselves at animal 
exhibitions because ‘parents capitulate to some [monolithically evil] 
socio-cultural force’ (p.269). A more plausible account might make 
reference to the perversion of an innate disposition toward animal 
affinity (ie the biophilia recently theorized by a broad range of 
scientists).1 
 
When it comes to prescribing therapies for the dismal state of biotic 
encounter in our current culture, Malamud is modest at first and 
confesses ignorance of the right way to regard wild animals. Yet he does 
think there should be better ways than zoological display, ways that 
would be more genuine and holistic. His chief recommendation is that 
we enhance what could be called our ‘biological imaginary’: because 
‘proper interaction with animals necessitates not [always] knowing 
exactly where they are’ (p. 177), it appears that ‘a better way to 
appreciate the animals with which we share this planet depends upon 
                                                 
1 See E. Wilson, Biophilia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984); S. Kellert 
& E. Wilson (eds), The Biophilia Hypothesis (Island Press, Washington, DC, 1993); S. 
Kellert, Kinship to Mastery: Biophilia in Human Evolution and Development (Island Press, 
Washington, DC, 1997). 
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the invisible: upon our imagination of animals ... when they are not 
immediately present’ (p. 185). Developing an enriched ‘mental bestiary’ is 
preferable to keeping zoos, Malamud claims, in that it is less 
constraining for actual animals and more stimulating for humans. What 
would this look like concretely? Imaginative exemplars of authentic 
animal artistry, for Malamud, are the poetry of Marianne Moore and the 
prints of Albrecht Dürer. Where would we get the natural history 
necessary to feed and discipline our own zoomorphic imaginings? Here 
Malamud comes up a bit short in defending nature documentaries as 
the lesser of evils (compared to either zoos or expanded ecotourism).2 
I'd suggest rather a renewed investment in local sanctuaries for the 
rehabilitation of displaced wildlife (eg Belize's Tropical Education 
Center) as well as greater attention to the prospects for visiting native 
refuge areas (eg Australia's Penguin Parade).3 
 
Though I have taken issue with Malamud on several points, I find 
myself in broad agreement with his book's overarching indictment of 
zoos as unauthentic institutions of animal representation. Perhaps he 
has over-stated his case, but then – given the abundance in zoo 
commentary of evasive apologetics and superficial reformism - it is 
refreshing to read a critique that pulls no punches. If not unique in aim,4 
Reading Zoos is distinctive in method and singular in depth (the wealth 
of literary coverage and careful interpretation is impressive in itself and 
fruitful for further study). Before reboarding the ark floated by today's 
conservation establishment, peruse Malamud and you may want to 





                                                 
2 An odd defense of a unidirectional medium (film), particularly since he goes on to 
reject the interactive imagery of computerized animals (CD-ROMs, WWW sites) as 
‘glitzy pap’ (p.262).  The advent on American cable of the channel Animal Planet - a 
kind of MTV of nature shows - demonstrates how biovisual broadcasts can be infected 
by the empty excesses of cyberculture.  
3 Likewise, opportunities for cross-species cohabitation in cities should not be 
underestimated. Cf. Jennifer Wolch's animal-friendly project of green urbanism in 
‘Zoöpolis’, in Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel (eds), Animal Geographies: Place, Politics & 
Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands, (Verso, New York, 1998). 
4 See also my ‘Extinction by Exhibition’, Human Ecology Review, 5/1, (1998), pp.1-4, and 
‘Zoöpticon’ in M. Carroll and E. Tafoya (eds), Phenomenological Approaches to Popular 
Culture, (Popular Press, Bowling Green University, 2000). For a sophisticated attempt 
at transformative commentary, cf. S.L. Montgomery's ‘The Zoo: Theatre of the 
Animals’, Science as Culture, 21, (1995), pp.565-602. 
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Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Brute Science: Dilemmas of animal 
experimentation, 286 pp., Routledge, London and New York 1996. 
 
 
Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks’s Brute Science: Dilemmas of animal 
experimentation builds a sophisticated and extremely convincing case 
against the use of animals in medical research. This is not to say that 
LaFollette and Shanks categorically reject animal experimentation, 
instead they call for more effective measures for evaluating the success 
of animal experimentation and a halt to exaggeration about its benefits. 
While this reviewer would have preferred that the book take a firmer 
stance on the issue, not least because the evidence marshalled seems to 
call for it, this is the only disappointment afforded by the work. 
 
The book is carefully organised around a progression of arguments that 
at first glance caused consternation due to the claim made early on that 
‘[w]e must delve deeper to determine the scientific and methodological 
merits of animal experimentation. Only after we have done so will we 
be able to morally evaluate the practice’ (p. 18). The suggestion that 
moral considerations about the treatment of animals rest upon potential 
benefits to other species is a position I would hesitate to support. 
However, setting this objection aside it is clear that the authors put their 
proposition to excellent use, producing a case that exploits the 
uncertainty of benefit in contrast to the considerable moral costs of 
experimentation. 
 
Brute Science begins with a succinct account of both sides of the 
vivisection debate. A central thesis of the book is that the use of 
examples in arguing for or against vivisection is an inadequate strategy 
unless these examples are evaluated in the context of best current 
biological theory, here, evolutionary theory. Thus examples of medical 
successes and failures produced by vivisection mean nothing unless the 
ways in which such successes or failures occurred can be explained 
through theory. Given that often times this debate is indeed conducted 
on the level of example exchange, this is an important insight, and one 
which shapes the book profoundly. 
 
Chapter three looks at the origins of the current biomedical model, 
citing Claude Bernard as the father of modern biomedicine. LaFollette 
and Shanks note that Bernard embraced animal experimentation for two 
main reasons, firstly because he considered observation and clinical 
research unscientific due to the difficulty of controlling variables 
adequately, and secondly because he rejected evolutionary theory and 
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any concommitant view of species as significantly different. As a result, 
he believed that science was best served by experimentation on animals 
where as many variables as possible could be controlled, in the context 
of a view of species differences as no more than superficial. 
 
Thus, the book demonstrates that present day experimentation is 
founded upon the rejection of evolutionary theory, a state of affairs that 
is somewhat problematic given that evolutionary theory is presently 
well accepted. Chapter four details the current biomedical paradigm 
and makes clear the ways in which Bernard’s views are still central. 
Chapters five and six detail evolutionary theory, setting the stage for 
later arguments by emphasising evolutionary theory’s recognition of 
real species discontinuities and its commitment to the notion of 
nonlinear dynamical biological systems, a commitment that suggests 
that where particular species differences are apparent, these differences, 
though seemingly irrelevant to the experiment in question, limit the 
possibility of extrapolating research findings from animals to humans. 
Here, difference is understood to be not limited to single structures or 
functions in the body, but necessarily indicative of other variations. 
 
In this discussion a significant theme of the book emerges; that of 
difference. This theme recurs consistently in section two where animal 
experimentation is evaluated in scientific terms. A central dilemma 
based on difference is uncovered here, for while researchers wish to 
argue that animals are similar enough to humans to yield meaningful 
data about human diseases, responses to drugs and other matters, they 
also assume that animals are different enough to warrant different 
(inferior) moral consideration. Returning to evolutionary theory, the 
authors are able to demonstrate that both perspectives cannot coexist. 
Where higher cognitive states are absent in animals (an absence that 
allows morally for their use in experimentation) evolutionary theory 
tells us that other, physiological, differences must also exist. Thus, the 
very grounds upon which animals are considered valid moral subjects 
for experimentation are the same grounds for why they are unsuitable 
scientific subjects for experimentation. This review cannot do justice to 
the complexity of the arguments made in this section, but suffice to say 
that chapters seven to twelve provide very strong arguments against the 
scientific validity of vivisection. Worthy of note here is the observation 
that the most common defences of experimentation fall into the ‘it just 
works’ category, a defence necessitated by the existence of significant 
theoretical obstacles (demonstrated here) to seeing vivisection as viable 
and by the lack of a detailed and serious measurement of its successes, 
failures and costs. Also important to note is the treatment of basic 
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research in this section, a treatment that is by contrast scant, 
inconclusive and relatively weakly argued given that it is 
simultaneously treated as perhaps the only area in which animal 
experimentation has some clear value. This scant treatment becomes 
more telling later in the book. 
 
Having established that from a scientific point of view, animal 
experimentation occupies a very dubious location in relation to medical 
achievement, the authors move on to a moral evaluation of vivisection. 
Marshalling an impressive repertoire of philosophical arguments, the 
authors build a convincing case that due to the very uncertain scientific 
benefits of animal experimentation, moral justifications are difficult to 
launch effectively. For example, by arguing that current moral 
standards consider an evil perpetrated worse than an evil left 
unprevented, the onus is placed on vivisection to show exceptional 
benefits given that it is a widely recognised evil perpetrated in order to 
prevent the evils of illness. Additionally, having argued strongly for the 
vagueness and inconclusiveness around vivisection’s efficacy (as well as 
around its costs in terms of numbers of animals used), the authors are 
able to demonstrate that under these terms, the possible prevention of 
evil must be offset against the certain perpetration of evil. This is an even 
tougher moral and scientific ask, given the portrait of vivisection offered 
above. 
 
It is somewhat disappointing to this reviewer then (as I noted at the 
outset) that Brute Science stops short of identifying itself as opposed to 
animal experimentation. This may be a strategic move designed to hold 
the attention of those firmly in favour and easily put off by apparently 
partisan analyses, but nevertheless, it is a move not supported by its 
own material. Admittedly, there are many who hesitate to step 
decisively into the oppositional role in this debate, after all, even well-
known champion of animals Donna Haraway, in her influential 
Modest_Witness@Second Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse 
states, ‘my own ambivalence on the subject is unresolved’.1 However, 
having offered statements such as the following: ‘[t]o the extent that 
researchers cannot measure the benefits of a practice [vivisection], to 
that extent at least, they should not claim to know that the practice is 
beneficial’ (p. 173) and ‘[t]herefore, there are no compelling moral 
arguments for biomedical experiments using animals’ (p. 248) one 
would think that the authors’ conclusions would be stronger. Instead 
                                                 
1 Donna J. Haraway, Modest _Witness@Second Millennium. 
FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse (Routledge, London and New York, 1997), p.290 
(n54). 
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(and not insignificantly), policy recommendations are made which 
emphasise the need to learn more about animals used in research, the 
need to thoroughly evaluate animal research scientifically and the 
importance of stronger public health interventions to deal with chronic 
and preventable illness. 
 
In the process, however, the authors return to the uncertain benefits of 
basic research to conclude that ‘[t]he evidence to hand suggests that 
biomedical research using animals - especially basic biomedical animal 
research - has benefited humans, albeit, indirectly, and might continue 
to do so’ (p. 262). Whether or not vivisection has benefited humans, 
Brute Science has singularly failed to support this statement. If such 
evidence exists, it is poorly represented in the book.2 As such, the claim 
signals a retreat from stronger conclusions that would be well-
supported in the body of the work. This, however, is the only criticism I 
would offer, given the stimulating and thoroughly argued material the 




                                                 
2 Though admittedly this perception may partly be influenced by my own strong 
objection to animal research. 
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Jonica Newby, The Pact for Survival: Humans and their Animal Companions, 
280pp., Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney 1997. 
 
Written by an Australian author and drawing heavily on Australian 
research and making points illustrated by regional examples, The Pact 
for Survival must have strong appeal for the local readership. Jonica 
Newby is an Australian veterinary scientist and science journalist, and 
she acknowledges a particularly heavy debt to another Australian 
veterinarian, David Paxton, drawing extensively on the ‘lateral 
thinking’ manifested in his doctoral thesis for the Australian National 
University. The book however is anything but parochial in the scope of 
its ideas. Indeed the outstanding characteristic of Newby's style is her 
ability to review and integrate a vast array of theories and data, from a 
vast range of sources. She draws upon the work of archaeologists, 
anthropologists, historians, geneticists, biologists, philosophers and 
ethologists (I’ve probably missed out some), making it accessible and 
useful to the general reader. 
 
The Pact for Survival must also have a paramount appeal to owners and 
lovers of domestic dogs and cats, investigating as it does the history, 
nature and origins of the relationship, and speculating as to its future. 
However, the questions raised about human evolution and society are 
hard-headed and exciting, and warrant widespread attention. At the 
outset Newby dismisses as counter-productive to serious scientific 
investigation the notion that dogs were somehow a human creation, and 
by the end she has certainly presented a challenging array of hypotheses 
as to how the two species came together and influenced each others' 
development. 
 
Why, Newby asks, have so few species succumbed to becoming pets? 
What was special about dogs and cats? When and how did the process 
begin? Is it conceivable that biological and social interactions between 
humans and their pets have resulted in actual evolutionary change in 
the human as well as sub-human species? How have they influenced 
our culture - and we theirs? In the latter part of the book a series of 
contemporary issues are addressed - are pets good for health? are pets 
bad for the environment? how do they fit into modern town-planning? 
All is drawn together in the concluding chapter, ‘The Urban Sextipede’ 
(after Paxton), which is provocative, persuasive and fun.  
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In broad overview, the story runs as follows. The available 
archaeological record shows that dogs have been around us for at least 
12,000 years. Conceivably, when DNA technology improves, there will 
be a case for arguing that dogs existed as a separate species as long as 
80,000 years ago, when humans were acquiring language. ‘First dog’ 
may have been a pet, a sewage system, a hearing aid, or, most probably 
in Newby’s opinion, all of the above. A major theoretical step is taken at 
the end of Chapter 1, with the contention that the mixed species 
community of dog-human was the unit on which natural selection 
operated. 
 
The next two chapters discuss evolutionary changes in canine and 
human species. For dogs, this has involved a reduction in brain size, a 
dulling of the senses, and neotenisation (retention of juvenile 
characteristics) - none of which Newby considers to be really bad, given 
the compensatory advantages of association with humans. An account 
of an amazing Russian experiment in fox farming supports the notion 
that selection for friendliness may bring about many and rapid physical 
changes. The Ancient Romans knew about selective dog breeding; the 
latest leap in such came with the establishment of breed standards in the 
late 19th century. The chapter on humans begins blandly enough, 
discussing the impact of domestic animals in various aspects of our 
culture - of dogs on hunting, cattle and cats on agriculture, horses on 
transport and warfare. The real excitement comes with the examination 
of Paxton’s thesis, that the ‘extension’ of the human brain brought about 
by the domestication of canines to include the dog’s superior olfactory 
capacities permitted the substitution of the apparatus of speech for the 
organs of smell, within the limited space of our cranium. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 take up very broad issues relating to human-animal 
cultural interactions. Chapter 4 examines the changing fortunes of cats 
and dogs across human history and habitat - their casting as devil, 
insensate object, pariah, dinner, and finally, pet. A pet is defined as ‘an 
animal that is kept for no other purpose.’ The rise of pet-keeping in 
Europe from the 18th century onwards is portrayed as involving a shift 
from opportunism to empathy, and as at least partly resulting from 
increasing urbanisation. Here is foreshadowed the theme on which the 
second half of the book pivots. Before that happens though, Chapter 5 
describes portrayals of animals in art, language and literature, moving 
on to a mind-blowing discussion of ‘talking with the animals’. Another 
large-scale ongoing study of canine behaviour is reported, this one from 
the Anthrozoology Institute in Southhampton, England, addressing the 
issue as to whether communication in modern dogs has significantly 
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departed from that in wolves. Results show that it has; furthermore all 
the new signals displayed are to do with ‘being friendly’ - to us. Do 
dogs have a culture? Well, yes, but canine cultural transmission occurs 
via the mediation of human language. It is we who pass down to the 
next generation of ourselves what and how to teach our pets! 
 
There follows a competent review of the literature (much of it carried 
out in Australia in the ’nineties) on the healing properties of pets in 
contemporary life. The positive evidence suggests to Newby that the 
adaptive biological function of dogs and cats in human society 
continues, only differently. They help us deal with the challenges of 
urbanisation, most notably loneliness. The author then goes on to 
counter the notion (particularly popular in Australia) that an urban 
presence of animal companions has a downside insofar as it increases 
pollution, a task she accomplishes with ease and some levity. For one 
thing, keeping pets helps to satisfy our drive towards nurturing, thus 
assisting with zero population growth. More positively, she expounds 
the concept of ‘biophilia’ (after E.O. Wilson) - that we are genetically 
programmed ‘to seek out natural settings and affiliate with animals and 
plants’. Unfortunately, modern town planners have forgotten to 
incorporate the means for pet-keeping into their designs. The interests 
of the animals and their owners are either ignored or misconstrued, as 
the very demographic trends which make animal companionship so 
valuable at the same time militate against maintaining it. We need them 
more, but can have them less. Of course, in Beijing there is a dog farm 
for city-dwellers to visit, while in Tokyo canine walkees may be rented 
by the hour! 
 
David Paxton argues the need to examine community change in terms 
of how it affects a single, indivisible unit, made up of one two-legged 
and one four-legged partner - the Urban Sextipede. Newby’s final 
chapter is one of advocacy, in which she instances ways and means of 
dealing with this entity, at the official and self-help levels. She is 
passionate, practical, but also pessimistic. Although humans may be able 
to survive in environments hostile to our ancient genetic partners, do 
we really want to live there? 
 
There are now lots of books on dogs and cats. Beginning in the 19th 
century with treatises on their care and breeding, in the 20th century we 
have this tradition continued, supplemented by manuals of dog 
training, anecdotes and biographies, histories and picture books. In the 
second half of the century the field expanded to include psychological 
and biological studies, beginning in 1954 with Konrad Lorenz’s Man 
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Meets Dog. Recently philosophers and psychologists have taken up 
issues relating to the presence or absence in these species of 
consciousness and emotion. The present book touches on most but goes 
way beyond any of these modes in its breadth of knowledge and ideas, 
scope of enquiry, seriousness and wit. 
 
 
Alison M. Turtle 
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Clinton R. Sanders, Understanding Dogs: Living and Working with Canine 
Companions, xviii + 201pp, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1999. 
 
There is some conflict between the title and the content of this book. 
Understanding Dogs is more a sociological study of how people relate to 
dogs than it is a study in how to understand dogs. Sanders uses 
observations of his own dogs, puppy training classes and the running of 
a major veterinary hospital, interviews with dog care-takers (which he 
equates with pet-owners), veterinarians, guide dog trainers and guide 
dog owners. 
 
Sanders begins with comments on the ways pet ownership relates to self 
esteem, status and human sociability. Next he relates the dog owners’ 
beliefs about the capacity of dogs for thoughtful behaviour. Commonly 
the owners do think that their dogs exercise reason but usually as linked 
to emotions such as anger. The brief account of deception in dogs is 
fascinating. Dogs are often regarded by owners as persons. Further 
discussion on this point would have been welcome in the light of its 
importance in developing an ethics in relation to animals. (There is very 
little directly on ethics in this book, though the author displays love and 
respect for dogs.)  
 
Chapter Three focuses on what it is like to become a guide dog owner 
and these owners’ ideas about their dogs unique personalities, attitudes 
and intelligence (including intelligent disobedience). Examples of 
thoughtful decision-making by these dogs are presented. The dogs’ 
empathetic abilities are also stressed. Then the discussion mores onto 
how the owners interact with other humans. Here the human-centred 
approach of the book starts to take hold.  
 
The next chapter on the veterinarian concentrates on the ways in which 
animals might cause problems in a vet clinic, not why. This does not 
deepen our understanding of dogs much beyond saying they experience 
stress and fear. There is a quite lengthy discussion about vets’ dilemmas 
over euthanasia, clarifying how vets need to distant themselves from the 
owners’ suffering. Very little is made of the loss to the animal incurred 
by death. There are some interesting points made about the 
consequences of regarding companion animals as persons or not but 
these are not taken very far.  
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We move on then to guide dog trainers. In the training centre studied, 
the trainers agreed that ‘“dog understanding” was the most essential 
attribute of a successful guide dog trainer’, but this is thought not to 
apply to other training schools. Again the emphasis is on the human: 
trainers and the public, trainers and the blind. ‘Dog understanding’ is 
made up of a knowledge of dog behaviour and canine ethology 
combined with an ability to ‘read’ the dog, to understand how the dog 
is experiencing the training sessions. A description of good guide dogs 
is given: dogs with ‘some degree of basic intelligence combined with a 
“willingness” to learn while putting aside his or her “natural” instincts’ 
(p. 99). Guide dogs are distinguished as hard or soft depending on the 
trainer’s estimation of their sensitivity. Some views of trainers are given 
on whether dogs have emotions or think. The strain in behaviourist 
analyses is clearly revealed, yet behaviourism is central to the training 
programmes.  
 
The final chapter entitled ‘Animal abilities and human-animal 
interaction’ promises to engage more directly with how to understand 
animals. Surveying and dismissing the view of animals as things, 
Sanders favours the idea of animals as actors. He argues that at least 
some animals have identifiable emotional experiences. They construct 
and use mental representations ‘in order to orient themselves to their 
surrounding physical and social environment’ (p. 113). They 
communicate these ‘thoughts’ to others. There is simply a difference in 
degree with humans. These general points are supported by a summary 
of the primate research. This is interesting but off the topic. There is an 
attempt to generalise to dogs but the same studies cannot be used. 
Anecdotes are presented (stories of specific dogs’ abilities) and some of 
the insights of the previous chapters are drawn together. The final 
section of human-animal interactions contains an intriguing discussion 
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Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue, Shanker, Stuart G. and Taylor, Talbot J., 
Apes, Language and the Human Mind, vii + 244pp., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1998. 
 
This book attempts to draw out the philosophical implications of the 
Kanzi (and Panbanisha) research for theories of language acquisition 
and mind. Kanzi is a bonobo (non-human ape) who works mainly with 
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh acquiring considerable linguistic skills. The first 
70 pages detail this research, which allows plenty of space to develop 
the philosophical arguments. This is done well but it is such a fertile 
ground, there is much more that could be said.  
 
Dolins, Francine L ed., Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare, x + 
262 pp., Cambridge University Press, Oxford, 1999. 
 
The sub-title to this collection is misleading. It consists of 17 papers with 
only 3 specifically on animal welfare. (One is by Mary Midgley.) The 
others cover issues to do with animal subjectivity, eg happiness in 
chimpanzees; attitudes to animals and the use of animals in research 
and education. Two of the most interesting contributions deal with wild 
animals and endangered animals.  
 
Manguel, Alberto, ed., By the Light of the Glow-Worm Lamp: Three 
Centuries of Reflections on Nature, ix + 373pp., Plenum Trade, New York, 
1998. 
 
Famous and not so famous authors are reprinted here reflecting on 
nature. Charles Darwin, Thoreau, Mark Twain, Audubon, Gerald 
Manley Hopkins, D.H. Lawrence and Nabokov are a few of the well-
known names. The essays or extracts are collected around four themes: 
landscape; birds; beasts; insects and fish. The beast extracts focus on: the 
cat, beaver, bonte-quagga, narwhal and monkey. This is an eclectic and 
entertaining edition.  
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Payne, Katy, Silent Thunder: The Hidden Voice of Elephants, 288pp., 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998.  
 
The result of 12 years studying elephants in Kenya, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, Silent Thunder explores the abilities of elephants to 
communicate with each other, sometimes over long distances, using 
infrasound - sound below the range of human hearing in 
communication. Detailed observations of elephant behaviour, 
beautifully written, are also presented. A timely book given the 
resurgence of the ivory trade.  
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